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


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*Professor Joseph H. Beale,*

Received *April 14, 1928.*







# THE GREEK QUESTION

BY ALBERT CAUTAIN

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First Published in Great Britain, 1911

Published by the University of Chicago Press, Ltd., in Great Britain  
and the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, U.S.A.

AMERICAN EDITION

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Washington, D.C.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMERICAN BRANCH

275 NASSAU ST. N.Y.C.

1911

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PUBLISHED FOR THE

**AMERICAN-HELLENIC SOCIETY**

106 WEST 40TH STREET (TILDEN BUILDING), NEW YORK, N. Y.

BY

**OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMERICAN BRANCH**

26 WEST 32ND STREET, NEW YORK

**1918**



APR 14 1948

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## PREFACE

It is not altogether easy, when the whole world is making such sacrifice and enduring such suffering in the cause of liberty, to dwell upon some of the happier accomplishments of the war for a new world. It is beyond question, however, that the pressure of military necessity has brought the people of the Allied nations into much closer and more intimate relationship than ever before and has forged new bonds of mutual confidence and understanding between them. Such a bond is the American Hellenic Society, recently founded, which aims to do for the people of the United States and those of Greece what similar societies, earlier established, have done for the people of Great Britain, of France and of Japan.

Greece is a name to conjure with. No man or woman who knows the history of Western civilization can fail to respond with a thrill of interest and appreciation when the name of Greece is heard. The place of Ancient Greece is secure. Her achievements in art, in letters and in science will never be seriously challenged. Modern Greece, however, is not alone the descendant of the Greece of ancient days, but also in no small part the product of forces and conditions which have influenced it, and before which it has sometimes been almost helpless. It appears that a happier day for Greece is about to dawn. Under the inspiring leadership of M. Venizelos, whose statesmanlike qualities are one of the ornaments of our generation, Greece has taken its natural place with the friends and defenders of liberty and in opposition to the forces of autocratic power and the rule of military might. The stimulus of this conflict and the satisfaction of these associations bid fair to

unite the whole Greek people through a new spirit of patriotic fervor and devotion. Modern Greece will then come to occupy the place in the world of to-day which is due to a people of its traditions and its characteristics.

The American Hellenic Society will constantly aim to make known the position, the interests and the ambitions of Greece, and to promote sympathy with them. It will aim to make the people of Greece and those of the United States more intimately acquainted one with the other by promoting in America the study of the ancient and modern language and literature of Greece and by promoting in Greece the study of the English language and of American history, literature and institutions.

Surely this aim is a noble one and one that will call forth and receive widespread sympathy and support. To this cause the series of publications, of which the present volume is the first, is dedicated.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,  
December 1, 1917.

## INTRODUCTION

THE series of articles on the Greek question by M. Auguste Gauvain well deserves to be made accessible to all thoughtful Americans who are interested in the problems connected with the great European war. Its author, because of his extensive political and journalistic experience, is splendidly qualified to treat of this extremely complex question. With a clearness and frankness which does M. Gauvain the greatest credit he casts light upon the responsibility which rests on the different nations, and upon the errors committed by them.

The essay reveals facts as yet unknown to the general public, facts that are incontestably true in that they are authenticated by documents the publication of which has been rendered possible only by the recent solution of the Greek crisis. It permits the reader, as he follows the startling events that succeeded one another in this crisis from which Greece has happily emerged, to understand the attitude taken by the Greek people. Because of their inactivity and their nonresistant attitude the Greeks were credited, in the judgment of many foreigners, with approving the pro-German policy of their king and with condoning all those abuses of power by which Constantine sought to impose his will upon the people.

M. Gauvain at the very beginning shows the fundamental error which characterized the policy of the Entente toward the Balkan powers. The sentiments of the Greek people and of the Greek government were at the beginning of the war decidedly friendly toward the Allied powers, while the attitude of Bulgaria on the other hand was, to say the least, doubtful. In the vain hope of drawing Bulgaria to their side the

Allies conceived the idea of the cession of Greek and Serbian territories to Bulgaria. Such a ceding of national domain is repugnant to any people, but it was even tragical in this case, for it was a question of surrendering territories which were inhabited by more than a million Greeks and Serbs, who had just gained their freedom as a result of the victorious wars of 1912-18.

The attitude of Bulgaria did not disabuse the Allies of their false point of view. Even the loan negotiated by her in Germany did not serve to dissipate their illusions. They obstinately insisted on demanding sacrifices on the part of Greece.

The masses in a country never make any effort to understand the psychological basis of actions; they prefer to pin their attention to the brute facts. Greek public opinion was therefore deeply stirred upon learning that the friends and protectors of Greece wished to lessen her territories and her influence, and at once the feeling was aroused in the national consciousness that Greece was being cruelly wronged. This bitter feeling was all the more increased and intensified by the fact that these sacrifices were demanded for the benefit and advantage of a people who were obsessed, as the Greeks had come to know by centuries of fighting with them for their own freedom, by the wild desire to dominate the near East.

It is easy to understand how Constantine and the agents of the German propaganda could profit by this error so as to present Germany as the defender of the territorial integrity of Greece. An attempt was thus made to create an anti-Ally sentiment in the minds of the Greeks.

M. Gauvain next examines the attitude of these same powers toward Constantine after he had dismissed Mr. Venizelos in October, 1915, and had begun, through the agency of ministers subservient to the royal will, his

provocations of the Allies and his machinations against their military forces at Saloniki, as well as those acts of espionage practiced against these same troops by his personal agents.

The Entente powers continued to preserve the same friendly attitude toward Constantine as in the past. Conference succeeded conference; the representatives of the Allies came forth from these interviews completely charmed, and their impressions were purposely spread abroad so as to hoodwink the people and hinder them from seeing whither they were being led.

Constantine was, moreover, at that time extremely popular in Greece. As a result of the victories of 1912-18, which had been cleverly exploited so as to give him the whole credit for the success of the Greek arms, the people had come to regard the king as that Constantine XII of Greek legend who was destined to liberate Constantinople, the city of the Byzantine emperors, thus restoring to Christendom the national Greek sanctuary, Saint Sophia, and to unite under his scepter all the Greeks, whether subject to Bulgar or Turk. It was, then, not to be wondered at that the people should have implicit confidence in their king.

This confidence of theirs was naturally strengthened by the attitude of the Allies toward him, for their friendliness was set before the people as a convincing proof of the sincerity of the king's declarations.

Some of his acts, however, which were not fully in accord with his words, finally began to provoke a certain restlessness in the minds of the people and to arouse in them a feeling of distrust. Constantine became aware of this, and foresaw the possibility of resistance. He instigated a reign of terror in order to prevent criticism of his acts. By virtue of a law passed by the Venizelist government, which prescribed the surrender of all arms in the possession of private citizens, the government, as the servile tool of the king, disarmed all citizens of whose



abject submission it was not sure. The last step in this policy of intimidation was the organizing of the League of Reservists, who were immediately equipped with regular army rifles.

The result was that nobody dared to utter a word of criticism. Enlightenment finally came, however, through the fight begun by the liberal party, for, as soon as the liberals felt themselves protected by the Allied fleet which anchored off Salamis in June, 1916, they hastened to make their will known. The people of Athens in a huge mass-meeting with one accord declared that Greece proposed to fulfill her duty as an ally toward Serbia and demanded that the king respect the oath that he had taken to support the Constitution.

The people of Athens presented their resolutions in a respectful form, for they hoped that Constantine would be induced to think and act as a Greek and would follow the decision of the people. But the Entente powers, far from supporting the stand taken by the people, continued through their official and obliging representatives in Athens to overwhelm Constantine with civilities and to treat him as a sincere friend who was anxious for one thing alone—the strict preservation of Greece's neutrality.

We are now in a position to understand fully how this whole attitude of the Allies was exploited, and thus to appreciate what anxiety and perplexity it must have produced in the minds of the Greek people, who were utterly misled by these strange contradictions.

The time finally came when Mr. Venizelos, despairing of his ability to bring Constantine to a full realization of his duties toward Greece and the Constitution, determined to have recourse to a revolutionary movement in order to save his country. The effect on the people of Mr. Venizelos' departure for Saloniki was enormous. If the Allied powers had at that time recognized the government of Saloniki as the only legal government

in Greece, Constantine would long since have yielded or abdicated.

Indecision, however, still characterized the policy of the Allies. Recognition of the government of Saloniki, even as a separate government, was long delayed, while friendliness continued to govern the relations between Constantine and the Allies. They carried this solicitude to such a point as to guarantee the king against any liberal propaganda in the territories which had not been able to free themselves from his jurisdiction, and Mr. Venizelos was even obliged to make reassuring declarations as to the non-antidynastic nature of the liberal movement.

Even after the criminal outrages of the king against the Allied troops disembarked at Athens, the attitude of the Allies continued to show the same contradictions. Furthermore, although some of the Allied governments were to all appearances fighting the Venizelist movement, yet it was the people alone that were made to suffer by the coercive measures employed against Greece.

It was in a chaos of this sort that the Greek people lived for a long time, and it was in the midst of all these contradictions that the liberal movement arose. It ought logically to have failed, but it did succeed. Do you ask why? Because it was in fundamental agreement with the deepest convictions of the Greek people, whose true sentiments and whose real aspirations it reflected. The most striking proof of this lies in the attitude of the Greek people toward the liberal movement.

Mr. Venizelos, applying to the letter his political motto, "The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," impressed upon the people that, in spite of their bereavements in the Balkan wars, in spite of their financial bankruptcy and the war-weariness of the nation, the march of circumstances imposed on Greece far greater efforts and more costly sacrifices. Mr. Venizelos knew as well as anyone that when men are called

upon to make personal sacrifices their ardor is likely to cool, for selfishness is a dominant element in human nature. He dared to make this appeal to the Greeks because he understood their way of thinking, their fundamental good sense and their love of country. He did it although he knew that Constantine, in opposing his policy, was appealing to the lower and more selfish instincts of men, declaring that there was no need of the Greeks subjecting themselves to sacrifices of their blood and treasure, but that it was rather their duty to enrich themselves and enjoy their acquired wealth.

The Greek people may well be proud of the proofs they have given the world of self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of an ideal. Rejecting the doctrine of a king whom they loved, they chose the *via dolorosa*. More than 30,000 volunteers replied to Mr. Venizelos' call to arms and hastened to Saloniki to offer their most precious possession, their lives, for no other object than to save the nation's honor, compromised by the arbitrary acts of Constantine and a handful of bullies that had terrorized the people. When one beholds a spectacle like this, when one sees so many men rushing into a frightful struggle for the sake of an ideal, the only possible explanation is that the surroundings in which these men lived, the very atmosphere which they breathed, was surcharged with these same ideas. Only thus are sentiments like these aroused and exalted to such a pitch that the individual is led to make the supreme sacrifice. The French Revolution is the most striking example of this truth. This is the proof positive of the actual feelings which dominated the Greek soul in spite of the king's teachings, in spite of the privations and humiliations which were imposed upon Greece as a result of a long-continued failure to understand her aims.

These sentiments were and are to-day an ardent love for the ideals of justice and liberty, a craving for national honesty and political uprightness, an attachment to the

democratic principles which form the groundwork of Greece's Constitution, and along with these a feeling of intense gratitude and affection for the nations that have contributed to the Greek renaissance in the nineteenth century.

After a blockade which lasted for ten months and which resulted in untold suffering on the part of the people, the soldiers of France and England on disembarking at Pireus in June, 1917, were received as brothers. Constantine did not fail to grasp the situation. He abdicated, without attempting the slightest resistance. He knew that he would find few Greeks disposed to attack the Allied troops, and he understood that the people as a whole did not share those sentiments which he had never dared to reveal and which have only recently come to the knowledge of the Greek people through the publication of documents of state.

Upon the departure of King Constantine and his courtiers, all apostles of the Pan-German idea, the Greek people once again breathed an atmosphere purely Greek. They began work at once in preparation for the fulfillment of their whole duty.

The day is at hand when all Hellas will take the part that by right belongs to it in that struggle for grand ideals pursued by the noble nations of the world. It cannot be otherwise. It is incredible, nay impossible, that the people who gave the world ideals of supernal beauty and of sublime thought that have never been surpassed should fail to share the great fight against base materialism and brutal might.

AMERICAN HELLENIC SOCIETY.



# THE GREEK QUESTION

## PART I

THE deplorable turn which Greek affairs took toward the close of last year is the consequence of the weak policy which has been pursued by the Triple Entente in the Balkans ever since the beginning of the European war. The errors committed during this period by the Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd have been numerous and grave. They may, in the last analysis, be traced back to two fundamentally wrong conceptions. In the first place, the governments of the three Allied countries misunderstood the nature of the great struggle that had just broken out and failed to make use of the appropriate means to end it according to their real interests. Secondly, they, at the start, interpreted the intentions of Turkey in a sense diametrically opposed to the facts of the case and at a later period committed the same blunder with regard to Bulgaria.

The ministers who directed foreign affairs in France, England and Russia during the second half of 1914 were all men of extended experience. In the course of their careers, they had had many matters of the greatest importance to arrange. They were personally acquainted, were in confidential relations with one another and could easily unite in a course of action. They were represented, each in the others' countries by ambassadors who loyally supported their policies. All conditions seemed united to permit them to conduct the diplomacy of the Entente with a firm and steady hand. They gave at the very beginning an evidence of clear-sightedness by signing the agreement of September 5, 1914, which bound



the three states together under reciprocal obligations for the duration of the war, and for the conclusion of peace. Unhappily in all that concerns the Balkans, they thought and acted as a Metternich would have acted. Attached as they were to a policy to be pursued simply for the good of the state, preoccupied rather with the end of the war than with the logical means of bringing it to an end, taking into account the maps of countries rather than the wishes of their peoples, they set themselves to pursue solutions which were based on the arbitrary re-distributing of territories. They imagined that by cutting the Macedonian provinces into shreds and by thoroughly recasting from top to bottom the Treaty of Bucharest of the 10th of August, 1913, they could succeed in satisfying all the Balkan States and in uniting them for a common purpose against our common enemies. In trying to nullify the Treaty of Bucharest, M. Delcassé, Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof acted against the most elementary political morality. Moreover, they undertook a rôle that did not belong to them. The Treaty of Bucharest was the just penalty for the sudden attack of Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece at the end of June, 1913. It certainly contained no clause that was harsher for Bulgaria than were the penalties contemplated by the three ministers against Austro-Germany for her sudden attack of August, 1914. It gave to Bulgaria more than it took from her. Except for the portion of Dobrudja ceded to Rumania, it deprived her only of hopes. These hopes were, it is true, great hopes, but they actually aimed at the establishment of the Bulgarian hegemony in the peninsula.

Certainly it was not for the interest of France, England or Russia to encourage or rouse these hopes. It was to the common interest of these three powers to interpose, in the Balkans, Serbia and Greece on the one side and Rumania on the other between Germany

and the Aegean Sea so that Germany might not control the routes to the Orient. The creation of a Greater Bulgaria, the declared rival of Rumania, Greece and Serbia, imperiled our influence from the Danube to the Persian Gulf. The historical and linguistic arguments invoked by the Bulgarians in support of their contention were not enough to make us approve designs contrary to our interest.

Besides, these arguments were specious arguments. They closely resembled the arguments advanced by Germany to justify its claims to the right to expand. The regions arrogated by the Bulgarian agents as having belonged to the Bulgarian Empire had belonged also to the Serbian and the Byzantine Empire. The historical rights, a never-failing source of conflict, balanced each other. The use of a language in a country gives to a neighboring country which speaks the same language no rights over it. Furthermore, the dialect used by the inhabitants of the greater part of the disputed Macedonian territory was closer to the Serbian language than to the Bulgarian. The Greek language confessedly preponderated in many villages claimed by the Bulgarians. There remained to be considered the desires of the inhabitants. In the eyes of liberal and constitutional states like France and England, this ought to have been taken into serious consideration. There is no evidence that the Cabinets of Paris and London troubled themselves about it at all during the first year of the war. In offering to Bulgaria certain territories, they forgot that their inhabitants had been living and acting as faithful subjects of Greece and Serbia since August, 1913. In common with the Cabinet of Petrograd, they left the moral aspect of the question entirely out of account. In the summer of 1913, with the complicity of Austro-Germany, Bulgaria treacherously attacked her two allies with the avowed purpose of despoiling them and, after subduing them, turning upon Rumania. Her calcula-

tions and her course of procedure were analogous to those of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia and England and were just as inexcusable. Politically and morally the sudden attacks of 1913 and of 1914 are closely allied. How, then, could the states that were the victims of the second have dealings with the authors of the first? How did they dare to exercise in Bulgaria's favor a pressure on the lawful victors of 1913? In virtue of what principle did they wish to suppress the just terms of the Treaty of Bucharest. Their conduct is to be explained only by the fact that at this moment they were guided by no fixed principle. They had in view only expedients. We must acknowledge that from the declaration of war by Germany to the intervention of the United States, the diplomacy of the Triple and then Quadruple Entente was one of expediency only. It drew its inspiration from unmoral diplomatic combinations. It busied itself with the allotment of Europe on the basis of plans decided on in the secrecy of the Cabinets. Apportionments were made in accord with desires rather than in accord with right. As a theoretical principle, there was much talk of the rights of nationalities, but these are susceptible of quite different interpretations, and it was perhaps just on this account that they were put so much in the foreground. There was less talk of the right of civilized peoples to dispose of themselves, for the application of this principle would have cramped these architects of the new Europe. They carried on their negotiations in the dark because they feared that broad daylight would disclose ugly facts. They thought themselves clever, but this very cleverness came near compromising the triumph of the cause of the civilized world. In short, at the most critical moment of modern history they gave themselves up in the diplomatic arena to such intrigues as are customary in parliamentary lobbies. Instead of taking their place fairly and squarely at the side of our friends

and against our enemies, the attempt was made to seduce an accomplice of our enemies by making a place for him at the cost of our friends. It is in some such way as this that a Prime Minister, when compelled to reform his Cabinet, sometimes tries to find a place for an adversary in the hope of rendering him harmless, instead of strengthening his ministerial majority by the addition of a reliable friend. He sometimes succeeds in prolonging in this way a poor existence as minister, but at other times he simply hastens his fall. In any case, he cuts no great figure in the world.

There would have been no great glory in obtaining a provisional success by winning over for the time being a Bulgaria which would without doubt a little later have seized the opportunity to put all in question by a course of blackmail. But to every attentive observer of the affairs of the Orient who lived in the sphere of realities and not in that of imagination, Bulgaria was riveted to the Central Powers by iron bonds. I shall have occasion to say later and at greater length in what these bonds consisted. I shall show also how no reasonable statesman of the Triple Entente ought to have given credence to the Turkish government's protestations of friendship. But contenting myself at present with the examination of the relations of the Entente with Greece, I shall try to prove that it was impossible in 1915 to satisfy Bulgaria without delivering continental Greece a mortal blow. From the entrance into line of Turkey in the autumn of 1914 up to the Bulgarian mobilization in September, 1915,—that is to say, during all the period of negotiation between the Entente and the Cabinet in Sofia,—not once did the latter formulate any precise conditions, the acceptance of which would have been followed by the signing of a lasting treaty. It veiled its replies in vague phrases and awaited proposals. Not only did this general attitude show clearly that it had no intention of treating and that it sought only to gain

time, but numerous indications in detail revealed clearly the purposes which it was very anxious to conceal.

At the very beginning it affected to consider as of no importance any enlargement of the country's territories at the expense of Turkey. Now the plan of the Entente was actually based on the possibility of compensating Bulgaria at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, which had just attacked Russia. The idea was a good one. If Bulgaria, in order to ally herself with us, had been contented with the annexation of Ottoman territory and rectification of her frontiers in Macedonia, no exception could have been taken to the affair. It was our business to try to sound her by negotiations in order to know where she stood. The mistake lay in following the negotiations up after we had discovered that the Bulgarian government demanded the hegemony in the Balkans. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria, without defining limits, let it be clearly understood that she must have the whole of Macedonia, and that she wanted to enter into possession of the Serbian and Greek territories, claimed by her immediately after the signing of the treaty, before Serbia and Greece should have received any compensation. It is what M. Ghénadief, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a time when the Cabinets of the Entente flattered themselves with having won him over to their cause, expressed as follows: "We must be paid. We want Macedonia to become once more Bulgarian, for it is inhabited by our sons. France had to recover Alsace-Lorraine, just as Italy had to recover Trieste. We have, you may as well understand, four Alsaces to recover—Turkish Thrace, Serbian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia and the Dobrudja. We wish to occupy at once the part of Macedonia held by Greece and Serbia." This declaration emanated from a man whom the governing parties in Sofia accused of lukewarmness in the national cause. It dates, it is true, from June, 1915, but it reproduces faithfully the aspirations of

the Bulgarian people, and the purposes of its government since the autumn of 1914 and even since the year 1913. The language of the press and of statesmen in Sofia leaves no doubt as to this point.

Hardly had the Treaty of Bucharest been signed, when at the instigation of Baron von Wangenheim, Ambassador of Germany at Constantinople, the Cabinet of Sofia entered into an arrangement with the Turks, and this too in spite of the fact that the latter had a few months before taken advantage of the embarrassment of Bulgaria to reoccupy and hold Adrianople. From this moment, the Bulgarians were dominated by the passion for Macedonia. They reconciled themselves with the Turks, sharing their hatred of Greece. In the hope of conquering Saloniki and Cavalla, they promised the Sultan all Thrace and the islands of the Cyclades. On their part, the Turks were roused by the desire to regain Mitylene and Chios. The Austro-Germans knew how to inflame these desires and the arrangement was actually consummated in October, 1913. It was agreed that comitadjis would on every occasion foment trouble in Macedonia and Albania and that they would always hold in readiness some cause for an intervention either by Turkey or by the Central Powers. In fact, comitadjis, armed with Bulgarian weapons, did not cease to terrorize now Albania and now Macedonia. It needed all the patience of the Serbian government to prevent the outbreak of a third Balkan war. The drama of Serajevo at the end of June, 1914, furnished Austro-Germany an unexpected pretext for the European conflict. The struggle in the east was for the time relegated to the background, but all its elements continued to subsist.

In more general ways, too, the Bulgarians have never made any secret of their intentions. They signed the Treaty of Bucharest under protest, because they were constrained and compelled to do so. Even in the treaty



itself, a paragraph records their mental reservations. Serbia had left them free to choose either the district of Kotchana or that of Strumitsa, and they preferred the latter, though less populous and more remote, because it projected out toward the railroad line of the Vardar. This became the base of operations for the comitadjis, who sallied forth again and again from this bastion to cut the railroad line in the valley of the Vardar, a line which formed a vital artery of communication for Serbia. According to the statesmen of Bulgaria then, who passed as friends of the Entente, Greek Macedonia was thus one of the four Alsaces of Bulgaria, a country whose official independence went back to 1908, and whose real independence began with 1878. It comprised all the territories situated between the Kara Sou on the east and the mountains of Albania on the west. In speaking of the cession of Cavalla, they were not serious. If it had been a question of this district alone, Greece would finally have yielded, for even Venizelos himself at one time (January-February, 1915) had been disposed to yield on this point. But Cavalla formed a little piece of Greek Macedonia. If the Bulgarians were particularly desirous to get it, this was due to its exceptional richness and in particular to its strategical importance in any move against Saloniki. The Greek government had acted very wisely at Bucharest in 1913 in insisting on keeping this in spite of the Russian protests, for it knew that Bulgaria, intent on getting its revenge, would make use of this as a base for the conquest of Saloniki. Furthermore, Cavalla is a city almost exclusively inhabited by Greeks. The Cabinet of Sofia in their brief occupation of the city in 1912-13, could not, according to the avowal of King Ferdinand's agents, find in the place a Bulgarian capable of discharging the duties of mayor. The Cabinets of London and Paris obstinately persisted, none the less, in their unpractical plans. They refused to listen to the Greek and Serbian statesmen in

spite of the fact that they knew their Bulgarian neighbors far better than M. Delcassé and Sir Edward Grey. As for Russia, she was a perfect M. Perrichon in her policy toward Bulgaria. Having contributed to create Bulgaria, she constituted herself her protector against all and sundry, although her protégé had passed over to Austria ever since the time of Stamboulof. She was possessed by the idea of bringing back the prodigal to the Slav fold, while he, freed from his leading-strings, lavished fair words on his old guardian, but in secret sought means to break away more completely from her guardianship.

Not to go into the details of the negotiations that were carried on in secret, and that are still imperfectly known, the account that I have given serves to show the underlying cause of that uneasiness of mind on the part of the Greeks which permitted our enemies to mock at our intentions and to turn against us a part of the population of the country. The desire to be truthful obliges us to confess our errors, and these errors that we have made will help us to understand, though we cannot excuse, those errors of a far more serious nature of which King Constantine has been guilty toward us.

The Greek question would not have arisen if the assassination of King George I at Saloniki in March, 1913, had not prematurely brought the Crown Prince Constantine to the throne. This prince, the husband of Princess Sophie, the sister of William II, had ideas as to the royal power that were diametrically opposed to those of his father. The former had respected the constitutional régime and had adapted himself to parliamentary customs, leaving the direction of affairs now to the leaders of one party and now to those of the other. But his son despised the democratic form of government. Educated at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, he admired William II's way of keeping things under his personal

control, and regarded as a family fief the kingdom over which George I had been called to reign under fixed conditions by the protecting powers and the will of the people, and he acted as the Lord's Anointed, although it must be said that his mind had no religious bent. He and his brother had adopted the principles of the old dynasties. During the life of George I they had enjoyed little prestige. They had even been excluded from the army after the revolution of 1909. It was Venizelos who brought the sons of George I again to power. At the time that he assumed control in 1910 he was convinced that Greece was not ripe for a democratic form of government, that she needed a dynasty, and that the thing to do was to strengthen the one that existed. He recalled the princes, restored to them their rank and set himself to increase as much as he could the prestige of the Crown Prince so as to facilitate later his royal task. He brought into prominence his military successes during the first Balkan war and followed the same course after the change of reign. Quite unlike ministers who try to eclipse their sovereign, Venizelos neglected no opportunity to enhance the glory of Constantine. This was not the flattery of a courtier, for at this time he was the uncontested master of Greece. It was done in the interest of a dynasty the strength of which seemed to him necessary to the maintenance of order in the country.

During the early part of the new reign the differences in temperament and tendency between minister and sovereign called forth no serious clash. Venizelos possessed within and without the country an authority which impressed itself even on his enemies. In less than four years he had transformed Greece from a disorganized and discredited country into a well-ordered state, glorious and prosperous, and with an area twice as large as before. Wherever he had gone in other countries he had been regarded as a statesman. His judgment was admired and his character respected. He inspired feel-

ings of confidence. Within Greece, the old leaders, jealous though they were, had to bow before the restorer of their country. The liberal party, created by Mr. Venizelos after the revolution, rallied to itself the majority of the people. It became a real force in the state and was a decided novelty. Before that time the kingdom had been divided into fiefs dependent upon families that had taken a prominent part in the war for Greek independence in 1821. Although the state was essentially democratic, a sort of feudalism had established itself. An oligarchy governed the country, but an oligarchy without a program or fixed principles. Each clan had its chief and each chief wished to get into power in order to satisfy his followers and his own ambition. There had become established among the different chiefs of clan a way of "taking turns" at being leader. Spoils were divided in alternation with one another. Laws were passed to suit the circumstances of the hour, and the administration was entrusted to a personnel chosen because it resembled in its point of view the chief then in power. Charilaos Trikoupis was perhaps the only exception in this staff of prebendaries. Venizelos upset this rotten system and built up a real party founded on the deeper sentiments of the people and the permanent interests of the country.

Up to that time the people had submitted to the oligarchic régime, trying to profit by it. But they were not attached to it. Those who could go away to pursue fame and fortune did not fail to do so. Thus in both hemispheres, but notably in Egypt, France and England, there were established vigorous colonies of Greeks, disgusted with this succession of parties, and desirous to adorn Hellas with a new order and a new glory. Keeping up a regular contact with the land of their birth, they continued to exert an influence there. They recognized at once in Eleutherios Venizelos the man who could accomplish the work of regeneration. They encouraged

and supported him. Immediately after he had taken the reins of government into his hands, the former Cretan leader revealed what he really was. Though he was the product of a military revolution, he sent the officers back to their barracks and forced them to submit to discipline. He re-established the constitutional régime, which had been warped by misuse. He guaranteed an honest administration of local affairs, stimulated the productive power of the country, lightened the burden of taxes, had laws passed that protected labor and restored the independence of the courts. In the Chamber of Deputies he rallied a devoted majority. The old parties disappeared. None of the old leaders could gather solid supporters about him. Only an impalpable residuum of objectors was left. To the regret even of the Prime Minister, who would have liked to find before him a constituted party to discuss measures, there was no longer any opposition in the parliamentary sense of the word. The government had not suppressed it by the means in use in other countries—Rumania, for example. It had simply disappeared like the mist before the sun. Venizelism represented not a dictatorship, not the preponderating influence of one man, but a régime with methods and ideas shaped according to the reasoned will of the upper classes of the citizens and the instinctive desires of the masses.

At the moment when the European war broke out the liberal party was all-powerful and the king could not dream of imposing his personal political views. It was due to external events that the design to substitute personal for constitutional government took shape.

Mr. Venizelos was at Munich, en route for Brussels, where he was to meet the Grand-Vizir in order to settle the question of the islands, when he learned of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He at once took his stand. On the 25th of July, right from Munich, he

telegraphed instructions to Athens, to the following effect: "It is of supreme importance not to allow any doubt to exist as to the intentions of Greece. Greece cannot stand with arms folded in the presence of a possible attack on Serbia by Bulgaria. She could not tolerate such an attack, for it would lead to an aggrandizement of Bulgaria and would put in question the Treaty of Bucharest. This attitude is imposed upon her alike by her duties as the ally of Serbia and by the instinct of self-preservation." At the same time, he sent a dispatch of like import to Mr. Theotokis (junior), minister of Greece in Berlin, begging him to inform the German government that if Bulgaria attacked Serbia it would be impossible for Greece to remain neutral. While still in Munich, he received a dispatch from Mr. Pachitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, begging to know what attitude Greece was to take. He replied at once that being, as he was, at a distance from Athens, he could give no official pronouncement, but that on returning to the capital he would support the following opinion: Greece must hold her forces ready to oppose Bulgaria in case she attacks Serbia; she must protect the latter against the danger of an attack in the rear and guarantee respect for the Treaty of Bucharest.

On August 2, after a meeting of the Cabinet, Mr. Venizelos addressed to Mr. Pachitch an official dispatch of which the tenor was about as follows:

The fact that the independence and territorial integrity of Serbia constitute a capital factor of the Balkan equilibrium, created by the Treaty of Bucharest, to which Greece is resolutely attached, is enough to dictate to the Greek government the measures that it must take for the present in order to come to the aid of Serbia, a friendly and allied country, in the most effective way. The Greek government thinks that it can best fulfill its duty as friend and ally by holding itself ready to repulse every attack against Serbia on the part of Bulgaria. An immediate armed intervention by Greece would be fatal to Serbia. In fact, Greece could send only weak forces to succor



Serbia against Austria-Hungary, and besides, her situation as a belligerent state would expose Saloniki—the only route open for supplying Serbia with food and munitions—to a decisive attack. The duty of Greece is to hold her forces intact in view of a possible Bulgarian offensive that might endanger the safety of the two countries.

The same day Mr. Venizelos caused dispatches of the same purport to be sent to London, Paris, Petrograd and also (*mutatis mutandis*) to Sofia. With the clear view of a man who took in the whole political horizon, he decided without losing an instant, and made known his decision. At this moment William II, having determined to array the maximum of strength against the enemy, urged Constantine to give him his active support. He sent him several telegrams in German, attempting to dissuade him from joining in with the *Meuchelmörder* of Serbia, and warning him that if the policy of Greece was opposed to that of Germany the family relations of the king would suffer for it. Constantine I at that time resisted this pressure because his Prime Minister wished him to do so, and because he knew, from personal experience, that his imperial brother-in-law cared little for Greece. In the spring of the preceding year he had secretly sounded William II, without the knowledge of the Greek government, through the agency of Mr. Theotokis, former Prime Minister, who had been sent to Berlin to announce the accession of Constantine I. At the bidding of the king, Mr. Theotokis had asked William II if Greece could, come what might, count on the permanent friendship of Germany. At the time the emperor was unwilling to answer, but he later caused the following reply to be sent to the king through Count Quadt, his minister at Athens:

The imperial government finds itself unable to adopt the Greek point of view. The alliance which unites her to Austria-Hungary and Italy prevents her from entering into negotiations

on subjects that touch the interests of her allies. Germany regards it as her duty to second these interests without any evasion, and this duty hinders her from taking any initiative in a question that lies within the sphere of influence of her allies. Unfortunately, Germany can do nothing for Greece. All the interests of the empire push her toward states whose views do not accord with those of Hellenism.

This billet-doux was sent before the sudden attack of Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece. No matter how much of a Germano-maniac he was, Constantine must have experienced a shudder in connecting the last words of his brother-in-law's rebuff with the Bulgarian treachery of the 29th of June.

After the Treaty of Bucharest the German ill-will toward Greece persisted. In the month of January, 1914, in London, Mr. Venizelos sounded the British government as to the pressure that the great powers would have to exert upon Turkey, in order to impose upon her the decision of Europe in the matter of the islands. Sir Edward Grey replied that England would go so far as to make a naval demonstration in order to enforce respect for the decision of the Conference of London, with the distinct understanding, however, that Germany's consent should first be obtained. Germany, when sounded in her turn, "refused to co-operate or even to consent to any action against Turkey that had an avowedly unfriendly character." Nay more, she refused later to take part in what was a merely formal warning sent by the great powers to the Sublime Porte. She persisted in the same attitude throughout the whole of the Eastern crisis. In the month of April, 1914, Von Bethmann-Hollweg and Baron von Wangenheim, who accompanied William II to Corfu, declared peremptorily to Mr. Venizelos and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Streit, that Greece could not count on the help of Germany in her relations with Turkey and that if the islands were to pass under the control of Greece in con-

sequence of the weakness of Turkey, this state of things could not be regarded as permanent or definitive. According to Von Wangenheim the islands, following the natural law, would pass under the control of the master of the Asiatic coast at the time of the settlement of the Eastern Question. No political influence and certainly no Greek political influence could be admitted in the neighborhood.

Thus in what concerns Greece, Germany declared that she was inspired not only by her formal alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy, but also by a secret alliance with Turkey. At bottom she sustained the Cabinet of Enver Talaat, whose bloody accession she had helped to bring about in January, 1913. She urged him on in his policy of forcing the subject populations to embrace Mohammedanism, and to become Turks. She approved the war against the privileges of the Greek patriarchate. Far from thinking of facilitating or tolerating the dismemberment of Turkey, she tried her best to galvanize the sick man of Europe. From a military point of view she needed his aid against Russia and England; from the point of view of economical advantage she wished to keep for herself the commercial and industrial exploitation of vast regions destined to a great future. In short, she was fundamentally anti-Greek. If she had in August, 1913, voiced her opinion that the Treaty of Bucharest be not submitted to the revision of the great powers, it was not for the sake of showing herself friendly to Greece; it was in order not to offend the king of Rumania, who meant to keep what he had gained by his intervention and who had declared to his two Germanic allies that he would not stand for a Greater Bulgaria. William II had at that time soothed Austria-Hungary by promising her a fine revenge at no distant time for her last disappointments in the Balkans. Meanwhile, he had not ceased to sustain her claims in Albania and Epirus as against the interests of Greece. In all these questions,

as in that of the islands, the Cabinet at Athens found support only in the Triple Entente. In spite of certain failures the Entente had as its guiding principle that the Christian peoples under the Ottoman domination had a right to certain liberties and that if the Ottoman Empire was to be broken up in whole or in part, these peoples ought to be called upon to form independent states. On the contrary Germany was for denying these peoples any autonomous existence. The only reason she excepted Albania was because the autonomy demanded for this lawless country effectively concealed an Austrian protectorate. Prince William of Wied, appointed *bret* of Albania by the Conference of London, was simply a lackey of Vienna and Berlin. He was charged with the duty of thwarting with all his power Serbian and Greek influences.

Under these circumstances, Venizelos must have had little difficulty in the first days of August, 1914, in getting Constantine to support his views. With his habitual frankness he explained his position plainly to Count Quadt. He set forth to him that in the war which was beginning, it was inconceivable that Greece should take part against the three protecting powers whose interests were in accord with her own. Consequently, she would remain neutral as long as the Balkan equilibrium created by the Treaty of Bucharest was not compromised. In an official dispatch of the month of August, the German government recognized the soundness of the position taken by the Cabinet of Athens, and Bulgaria, since she was willing not to intervene as long as Greece guaranteed to remain neutral, kept out of the war for the time being. William II did not insist on her acting because the staff in Berlin, fully engaged with more important operations elsewhere, did not yet wish to commit itself deeply to any Balkan movement. It put into play other means.

In the second fortnight of August Mr. Venizelos in-

sisted on defining before the Entente the attitude of the government which he directed. At the very height of the German onset against France, he thought it proper to inform the Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd that he was in sympathy with them, and that Greece could put her forces at their disposal for future operations in the Balkans. France and England acknowledged the receipt of this offer and replied that they would take advantage of it as circumstances required. Further George V sent a telegram to King Constantine to thank him and to inform him that he had ordered the British Admiralty to come to an understanding with the Greek staff on the method of co-operation of the forces of the two countries. Constantine I replied with a friendly telegram, stating that the Greek naval staff was prepared to confer with England's representatives. This exchange of dispatches took place through Admiral Kerr as the intermediary.

At this time a significant incident took place. The Greco-Turkish conference which was to have occurred at Brussels in order to settle the differences between the two countries was transferred to Bucharest. There, Talaat Bey was not content with formulating unacceptable claims as to the islands; he strove to form a coalition of the Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks and Rumanians against Serbia. In spite of his finessing, he betrayed the game of Germany, whose cards he held. Mr. Venizelos refused downright to have anything to do with the plan, and recalled his two delegates, Messrs. Zaïmis and Politis. William II was not discouraged. Realizing that as long as Mr. Venizelos was in power, he constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of his Balkan plan, he undertook with the aid of the old parties to overthrow him. Mr. Streit, Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose competence in international affairs Mr. Venizelos had thought he could utilize, never thinking of the possibility of treason on his part, became the tool of this plot

and recommended war against Serbia. Mr. Venizelos at once foiled the scheme. He requested Mr. Streit's resignation and rejected the German proposition in these words: "Greece is too small a country to commit so infamous an act." He maintained 120,000 men under arms and furnished Serbia every facility that she desired for renewing her supplies of munitions and war materials by way of Saloniki and the Vardar railroad.

Even as late as the end of autumn, 1914, the Berlin staff did not seem to have decided on action in the Balkans. There is every reason to believe that it was not in favor of the second Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia. But General Potiorek, who was in command of the forces of the Dual Monarchy on this front, was impatient to win his laurels. Full of contempt for the Serbians, he thought that he could easily gain the victory over them. He entered upon the campaign before the Berlin Cabinet had arranged for the co-operation of Bulgaria. Czar Ferdinand, always a deceiver, did not put his armies in movement. He pretended that he was observing an official neutrality so as not to provoke a counter-intervention on the part of Greece. But he mobilized his comitadjis, furnished them with arms and even with cannon, and permitted them to make an inroad right into Serbian territory. In December, when the Serbs were in a nearly desperate condition, the Bulgarian comitadjis invaded Serbia and blew up the bridges on the Vardar and near Zaitchar, which formed the only routes of communication by which Serbia was connected with friendly countries. The Cabinet at Sofia washed its hands of the matter, pretending that these raiders were Macedonians. Macedonians or not, these men were armed and paid by the famous Interior Organization of Bulgaria, which was in close relations with the government and could only operate with its connivance. If Serbia, contrary to

expectation, had not by a superhuman effort recovered herself, Bulgaria would have rushed upon her so as to be in at the death. But the armies of Potiorek were finally completely defeated. They were forced back over the frontier after having been subjected to enormous losses in men and material. The Interior Organization recalled its comitadjis and Bulgaria awaited a more opportune occasion.

For fear that she might be discouraged and be tempted under the pressure of Russophiles to go over to the Entente, Germany concluded with her, in the early days of 1915 a financial arrangement complementary to the loan-contract which had been signed shortly before the war but which owing to circumstances had not been executed. The syndicate of German and Austro-Hungarian banks which had undertaken to lend five hundred million francs to Bulgaria agreed to advance to her, in exchange for treasury notes accepted at par, one hundred and fifty million francs at seven and one-half per cent., of which seventy-five millions were payable at once, and the rest at the rate of ten millions every fortnight beginning with the 14th of April. By means of these fortnightly payments Austro-Germany held in leash the Radoslavof Cabinet.

About the same time, after long delays, the Triple Entente decided to undertake against the Dardanelles a movement designed to reopen its communications with the Black Sea and to checkmate Turkey. Desirous also of protecting Serbia against a new offensive she was eager to secure Greece's material aid, which was valuable to her for the sake of the intimidation of Bulgaria, the use of her fleet for purposes of transport and patrol and the occupation of bases of operation in the vicinity of the Dardanelles. On January 24 Sir Francis Elliot, Minister of England at Athens, communicated to Mr. Venizelos a telegram from Sir Edward Grey suggesting to Greece a concerted action in the Balkans, "in return

for very important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor." At this time the Cabinet in London still cherished illusions as to Bulgaria. In spite of all that had happened, it hoped that she would yield to its solicitation and would consent to align herself on the side of the Allies. Mr. Venizelos was so captivated by the prospect of re-establishing Greece as she had once existed in Asia Minor, that he showed himself disposed to cede to Bulgaria the districts of Cavalla, Sari-Chaban and Drama (c.2000 square kilometers) and also not to oppose the cession to her of a part of Serbian Macedonia. He laid down conditions for this which appear to have been finally agreed upon by the council of ministers and the king. But the hostile attitude of Bulgaria and the decision of Rumania to hold off hindered the execution of this first project.\* It was taken up a little later in connection with the Dardanelles expedition alone. It was on this occasion that the first clash between Mr. Venizelos and Constantine I occurred.

The Cabinets of Paris and London at that time renewed their offers as to Asia Minor, demanding in return only the co-operation of Greece against the Dardanelles. After some rather hurried negotiations, Mr. Venizelos was in a position to present a definite proposition, which was discussed March 3 and 5, in two Crown Councils in which the ex-Prime Ministers took part. According to the terms proposed and agreed to by Paris and London, the whole Greek fleet was to co-operate with the Anglo-French fleet, but the participation of the land forces was to be limited to a single division (15,000 men), the rest of the army being required to overawe Bulgaria. Many objections were made. Attention was called to the fact that the proposals came from France and England alone, and that Russia was opposed to the entrance of Greek troops into

\* The detailed account of these negotiations will be found in M. Leon Maccas' book, *Ainsi parla Venizelos*, pp. 34 ff.



Constantinople. Mr. Venizelos was able to reply that Russia had given her consent, and that the Cabinets of London and Paris undertook to reconcile in matters of detail the Greek and Russian points of view. As another argument a great deal was made of the adverse opinion of the Greek staff. According to this the Dardanelles could not be forced by an isolated naval action. As a result of profound study of the question, the staff had reached the conclusion that it was necessary to land at least three divisions on the shores of the Gulf of Saros. This objection was only too well founded. But it could be countered by directly recommending to the Allies the action on land in the indicated region, a region which was, as a matter of fact, very well chosen. Difficulties as to the delimitation and administration of the territories promised in Asia Minor were also raised. Mr. Venizelos met all these arguments, and devoted himself to showing how immensely important it was for Greece to appear in the Orient at the side of the Western powers, and incidentally to assure herself a magnificent domain of 120,000 square kilometers inhabited by flourishing Greek colonies. This would in a marvelous degree supplement the present possessions of the realm and would strengthen Greece's hold on the islands. The king broke off the second session without reaching any decision, but on the following day he made known his refusal. Mr. Venizelos submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Mr. Gounaris was charged with the duty of forming a new Cabinet with power to dissolve the Chamber. He associated with himself as Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Zographos, former High Commissioner in Epirus.

Mr. Venizelos did not think it proper at this time to provoke a struggle as to the constitutionality of the king's action. In an interview granted to the correspondent of the Havas Agency (March 13, 1917) he thus justifies his course: "In February, 1915, the action

of the king might have been regarded as constitutional, at any rate, formally, for a disagreement as to policy having arisen between the king and myself, it was possible to hold the opinion that, inasmuch as the last elections dated back to three years earlier and New Greece had as yet no parliamentary representatives it was possible, I say, to hold the opinion, that it was the duty of the country to decide the point at issue. I might well regret this procedure and might even find it injurious, but I could not rebel." He did not rebel, but he immediately exposed the critical situation created by his fall. Calling to his house the deputies of the liberal party, he showed them the consequences of the decision of Constantine I. "We have let a unique opportunity escape us. The harm done is irreparable. Nothing can make things right again even supposing that our government should be recalled to power and invited to enforce the decision taken by it." When attacked later by his successor and the court, he published two communications which he had addressed to the king in the last days of the crisis. These two letters have an historical interest. With prophetic lucidity the minister explained to his sovereign that the fate of Hellenism was deeply involved in the success of the Triple Entente, and that if Austro-Germany should triumph, Bulgaria would seize all Macedonia with Saloniki included, Turkey would again take possession of the islands, Hellenism in Asia Minor would be rooted out and Greece would fall back into the stagnant condition in which she had been prior to the first Balkan war. The consequences to Greece could not possibly be more disastrous if, in alliance with the Triple Entente, she were to be defeated along with her. Her vital interests bade her take advantage of the state of war which existed between Turkey and the Entente in order to deliver the hundreds of thousands of Greeks living on the shores of Asia, to permit the 200,000 refugees of

Asia Minor to recover their homes and to double again the extent of the kingdom which had already been doubled once since 1912. "Your Majesty," said Mr. Venizelos at the end, "is in the very prime of life for creating by your sword a Greater Greece, and for firmly establishing this military exploit by a complete political reorganization of the new state. You can pass on to your heir and successor, when the hour comes, an achieved task of superhuman grandeur, such as is given few princes to consummate."

The question had been precisely put, and had been decided against the convictions of Mr. Venizelos and the general sentiment of the people. The former Prime Ministers who had been invited to attend the Crown Councils had recognized that the government was in accord with public sentiment, and Mr. Theotokis, though he was in the opposition, had declared to the king that he could not undertake to follow out his policy. We do not know to what extent Constantine I was then committed to William II. He could hardly at this early date appeal as an excuse to the danger of Greece's being crushed. The Russians were still in the Carpathians and Przemyśl, completely invested, was to surrender a few weeks later. Negotiations were being carried on to bring about the intervention of Italy. At all events, during the Gounaris ministry negotiations between Athens and the Entente were again taken up and Mr. Zographos did not cease to affirm his friendly feelings toward the protecting powers. On April 14, in reply to a request of April 10 that Greece should participate in the war against Turkey, he proposed that Greece should give military aid on condition that the Entente would guarantee the continental and insular integrity of Greece during the war and for a certain time afterward, that a naval and military agreement between the staffs should govern the conditions under which they should operate and that a treaty should fix the extent of the territorial

concessions promised in Asia Minor. It would have to be understood that the definitive object of the war was to be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Were these proposals made in good faith? It would be bold to affirm it. In any case, they deserved to be taken into serious consideration. They contained no unacceptable demand. The clause about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire raised, it seems, some anxiety. It was, however, very natural that the Greek government should wish to protect itself against a spurious solution which would have left her, at the peace convention, face to face with a Turkey eager for revenge. If the diplomats of western Europe took fright at the vista thus opened before them, it was because they had a less clear comprehension than the Orientals of the elements of this distinctly Oriental question. The guarantee of territorial integrity was clearly due. It was this, however, that seems to have hindered the negotiations from coming to a head. Still possessed with the idea of winning over Bulgaria, the diplomats of the Entente wanted to keep it in their power to offer to her eastern Macedonia and Serbian Macedonia. They permitted the proposals of the 14th of April to fall through, and this decided Mr. Gounaris' career. This politician, ambitious to become a party leader, would have been flattered to direct an intervention policy and to substitute himself for Mr. Venizelos. Repulsed by the Entente, he turned toward the pro-Germans and created an anti-Venizelist party. He proceeded to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, headed a furious campaign against the Venizelist candidates, bound his ministers to the king in a real solidarity, and proclaimed to the electors that they would have to choose between the policy of Mr. Venizelos and that of the king. Constantine, being seriously ill, interfered neither with his words nor his deeds. His protracted illness gave him, free as he was, by virtue of the Constitution, from any

personal responsibility, a convenient excuse for not breaking away from a shameful campaign.

The general elections of the 13th of June gave the Venizelists 184 seats as against 130 for the Gounarists. This was not a crushing majority, but the districts of the Greece of the time before 1912 had supported him almost in their totality. The Gounarist successes, on the other hand, had been won in New Greece, especially by Mohammedan and Jewish candidates. This was due to an intense pressure which was easily exerted by the government on heterogeneous populations which had been freed from the Turkish domination only three years before. The liberal party thus issued victorious from a very difficult test. Parliamentary custom required that Mr. Gounaris should retire and that Mr. Venizelos should be recalled to power. Nothing of the sort took place. Mr. Gounaris did not budge, and the king did not ask him to resign his place to the victor. The ministerial press continued with impunity to calumniate Mr. Venizelos. The calling together of the new Chamber was postponed under the pretext of the king's illness. If any doubt existed in the month of March as to the sentiments of Constantine I, such doubt could no longer exist in the month of July. His attitude can be explained only by his desire to resist the wishes of the people and by his faith in the victory of Germany.

It was probably in the month of July that the pact was made between the brothers-in-law. At this time, the Russians had been thrown back from the Carpathians and the Italian offensive had been stopped. The staff in Berlin had resolved to destroy Serbia. William II informed Constantine I that he was about to attack the Serbians with 400,000 men, that Bulgaria was in accord with him, and that he counted on Greece's remaining neutral. This notification was accompanied by a threat in case he was disobeyed and by a promise guaranteeing

the territorial integrity of Greece if Constantine followed his advice. The king yielded. His staff, which, up to that time, had shown itself hostile to Bulgaria, was willing to be convinced that, after all, they might just as well come to terms with her at the expense of Serbia; the main thing was to protect themselves against the Slav peril, springing from the union of two Slav neighbors; it made very little difference which of the two was crushed, provided one of them was put out of the way. This reasoning was fundamentally wrong, in view of the fact that Serbia desired no Greek territory, while Bulgaria wished to annex eastern Macedonia. Unfortunately, at this very time, in a note dated August 3, the Triple Entente demanded of the Cabinet in Athens that Greece should consent under certain conditions to cede eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria in order to permit the reconstruction of the Balkan confederation. This false step at such a critical time had deadly results. It cast into the shade the distant Bulgarian peril and brought into high relief the immediate sacrifices that were demanded. There was, it is true, no comparison between the extent of the districts that Bulgaria coveted and that of the districts which the Entente wanted Greece and Serbia to cede. But William II assumed responsibility towards Greece for the behavior of Bulgaria, which was moreover to be so generously compensated by her gains in Serbia that she would not claim anything elsewhere. This was without doubt an idle guarantee, but in the eyes of courtiers and intriguers it was quite enough to protect a sovereign and ministers who were disposed to permit themselves to be convinced.\*

\* Germany's bad faith in the matter seems established by the publication (October 9, 1915) in the Venizelist newspapers *Patria* and *Hestia* of a Germano-Bulgarian treaty dating from the previous July 17. This treaty, concluded at Sofia, gave Bulgaria all Albania, all New Serbia, Monastir, Guevghele, Doiran, Cavalla, Seres, Florina and Castoria. The tenor of this document was said to have been communicated by the English Legation in Athens. The German Legation denied its authenticity. But, on the other hand, it was maintained that the information was exact. If this is the case, we may well ask how England, knowing of this treaty, could have kept up her negotiations with Bulgaria until the beginning of October, 1915.

In the interview mentioned above, Mr. Venizelos estimates the importance of the incident as follows:

Between the elections and my return to the leadership of the government an important event had happened. The protecting powers had proposed to Greece to cede eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria. This proposition, apart from the fact that it did not satisfy Bulgarian ambitions, as was seen by what followed, was treacherously exploited by the pro-German propaganda and helped the cause of the royalists, who at once took the stand that Greece's territorial integrity must at all costs be maintained. I do not exaggerate when I say that if it had not been for this step the king would never have dared to repudiate the obligations imposed upon us by our treaty with Serbia. You ask me whether all this is simply an impression of mine. It is more than this; it is an absolute certainty based on facts and documents of which I had cognizance at that time. Further, it was only three or four weeks later that Mr. Gounaris let Rumania know that in case of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, Greece would not go to the assistance of her ally.

One thing brought on another. The failure of the Greek government carried with it that of the Rumanian government. Although it was even more to Rumania's interest than to Greece's not to let Serbia be crushed, because this put her vital communications and consequently her very existence at the mercy of Germany, she committed the same sin, the same crime against herself.

It was under these circumstances that the king recalled Mr. Venizelos to power without making him aware of his personal dealings with his brother-in-law. Some days later Bulgaria signed a treaty with Turkey by which the latter allowed her a very appreciable improvement of her frontiers, in particular at the very gates of Adrianople. This agreement was the counterpart of the one that followed the Treaty of Bucharest. It indicated that the time to act had come. The Turks had no notion of dispossessing themselves of valuable territories, without the certainty of material aid against the holders of Chios and Mitylene. Instead of determining the

Allies to take energetic precautions against Bulgaria, this arrangement moved them to show themselves more generous toward her. On the 14th of September, after long and painful pressure upon Serbia, they offered Bulgaria the spoils of Macedonia. Those were gloomy days for Mr. Pachitch and Mr. Venizelos. Yielding to the insistence of the Entente the latter resigned himself to Serbia's cession of Monastir to Bulgaria on condition that Albania should be divided between Greece and Serbia in such a way that these two countries should have a common frontier. Bulgaria answered by decreeing a general mobilization. Some Western Europeans suggested that this mobilization might perhaps be directed against Turkey; their blindness bordered on insanity. A man like Mr. Venizelos could not be deceived even for an instant. He submitted to the king and made him sign a decree ordering the mobilization of the Greek army (September 28).

Was harmony between minister and sovereign to be once more established? Mere spectators might have supposed this to be the case, for the evidence of the nation's peril was before all eyes. People who had been initiated into the ways of the Greek court were not so sanguine. They suspected that the pro-Germans had advocated the general mobilization so that the men under arms might be prevented from making any manifestations in Venizelos' favor and from supporting him by force in case a new disagreement with the monarch should cause his removal. This explanation seems too complicated to be right. At any rate, it was not to the taste of Bulgaria. When he learned the news of the Greek mobilization, Mr. Radoslavof made a scene before William II's minister: "You have cheated us," he cried, and launched into reproaches. William II was deeply interested in safeguarding his reputation and his interests. With furious intensity he put into operation every means that he had of influencing Constantine I.



The Gounarists who had lost their positions, the former ministers who were in retirement, such as Mr. Streit, the staff officers imbued with the spirit of the *Kriegs-akademie*, the snobs of the court and the people who were paid salaries by the German propaganda, joined with Queen Sophie and the king's brothers against Mr. Venizelos. This statesman who sought only the good of his country was a thorn in the flesh of all these people. The pressure of the Entente in the opposite direction was insignificant, formal and uncoordinated.

On the 29th of September the new Chamber met. Mr. Venizelos set forth the situation in the most gloomy light. However, since Bulgaria still pretended at this time that her mobilization had as its only object an armed neutrality, he contented himself with declaring that he returned to his earlier program as thus formulated. "The government is held by the obligations imposed upon it by its alliance with one of the belligerents, Serbia, and is determined to fulfill these obligations if the *casus foederis* arises." Mr. Gounaris maintained that the mobilization ought to serve only to protect the vital interests of the country, to the exclusion of any obligation imposed upon the country by the treaty of alliance with Serbia. On the 3d of October Russia, at last undeceived, called upon the Bulgarian government "openly to break inside of twenty-four hours with the enemies of the Slav cause and Russia" and to proceed at once to the discharge of officers belonging to the armies of states which were at war with the powers forming the Entente.

On October 4 the Greek Chamber held an exciting session, which was prolonged far into the night. The former leaders, Messrs. Dragoumis, Rhallis, Theotokis and Gounaris, made violent attacks on the Cabinet in connection with the dealings with Bulgaria. Taking advantage of a speech of the 28th of September, in which Sir Edward Grey, while threatening the Bul-

garians, again made proposals to them, they claimed that the Entente was manipulating things so as to renew negotiations at the cost of Greece. Mr. Venizelos replied that formal and official assurances had been given him that the promises concerning concessions to Bulgaria, even those on the part of Serbia, could be considered from now on as having lapsed. He added, "I am really convinced that if latterly there had not existed in Bulgaria a misunderstanding as to our policy, a misunderstanding due perhaps to the fact that in the last days of the government of the Hon. Mr. Gounaris, the ideas of the government underwent a certain alteration or a certain unsettling, if, I say, Bulgaria had not found herself misled as to the declarations of Greece touching this question, I have reason to believe that she would not have decided to mobilize, thus running the risk of lighting a conflagration in the Balkans." This was a thrust delivered straight at Mr. Gounaris. The former Prime Minister recoiled and dodged. When pressed by his successor, he did not dare to deny that a change of the nature indicated had taken place in the last days of his ministry. His connivance with Germany was thus clearly established. As it was only in accord with the king that he had acted, the conflict between the crown and the government became inevitable.

This came about *à propos* of the *casus foederis*. Mr. Venizelos declared categorically that Greece was bound to succor Serbia in virtue of the treaty of June 3, 1913, which had been concluded for a period of ten years. As to this point, I quote here the extract from the official record of the session:

At this time I no longer regard myself as justified in concealing from the representatives of the country and the country itself the fact that our treaty of alliance with Serbia is a general defensive treaty, on the basis of which each of the states binds itself to aid the other if one of them, without provocation on its part, is attacked by a third.

*Mr. Popp.*—By any third whatsoever?

*Mr. Venizelos.*—There is no “whatsoever”; the word is “third”! It was on the basis of this treaty, gentlemen, that when in May, 1914, our relations with the Ottoman Empire reached an acute stage, we addressed ourselves to Serbia, explaining to her the motives on account of which we were about to face a new war against Turkey, a war which we regarded as defensive, even though we were the first to attack, because the provocations on the other side had become intolerable. It was on this basis, I say, that we turned to Serbia to invoke her aid in case, during the war, we should be attacked by another state.

The Prime Minister might have stopped at that point. But consistently with his character and perhaps also to anticipate by a formal vote of the deputies the resistance that he foresaw on the part of the king, he tackled at once the eventuality of hostilities with the Central Powers. His words were these:

I certainly do not propose to you that we should declare war on Germany and Austria; but, gentlemen, if, in putting into execution our national program, if, while discharging what is for us a debt of honor, while fulfilling our duties as Allies, while defending the vital interests of the state, we find ourselves brought face to face with powerful nations, I am certain that, while expressing our regrets, we shall do our duty. [Applause!]

Before the manifest danger that comes on us from the north, threatening to rob us of what we have gained in the course of the last two wars, I should have proved myself irresolute and cowardly in not hastening to take such decisions as duty, honor and the highest interest impose on the nation. [Prolonged applause!]

After a passionate debate, these declarations were approved by the Chamber by 147 votes out of 257. If we add the nine ministers who abstained from voting, the effective majority was forty-six votes. This was not enormous, but if we take into account the conditions under which the dissolution of the Chamber and the new elections had taken place, and the vehemence of the debates, the majority was large. It would certainly

have approached being unanimous, if there had not been a feeling that the king was behind Mr. Gounaris. So the king's intrigue against Mr. Venizelos had failed. Constantine I ought to have recognized this. He could have cleared himself in the sight of his accomplices in Berlin by saying that he had done for them all that he could, but that being a constitutional sovereign he was absolutely prevented from going any farther. Now, Constantine, in lack of other qualities, is obstinate. He decided to override the vote of the Chamber. Making a pretext of the allusion to hostilities against the Central Powers, of which apparently there had been no mention in the Council of the Ministers held before the session, he informed Mr. Venizelos that he had gone beyond his rights and demanded his resignation. It was the plainest possible avowal of secret agreements with Germany. The king would never have dared to decide on such a stroke if his personal obligations had not run counter to the fulfillment of his duty as a constitutional sovereign. He gave the preference to the former. The minister thus affronted might have resisted, but he preferred to yield.

These two decisions of the 5th of October, 1915, were responsible for tremendous consequences. That of the king is not to be justified or excused from any point of view. It was a violation of his oath of accession, and it constituted an act of treason to the country. The soundness of the minister's decision is open to question. The Greeks of future ages will perhaps excite themselves about this as those of past ages have turned over again and again the question as to what would have happened if Alexander the Great had not died prematurely. What would have happened if Mr. Venizelos had kept the power in spite of Constantine I? Naturally this will never be known. Mr. Venizelos has developed at length the reasons for his docility in his

interview of the 13th of last May. He affirms that, left as he was to his own resources, he could not have resisted the king effectively; not being able to count on the support of the army, whose officers were for the most part devoted to the sovereign, he would have provoked the annihilation of the liberal party if civil war had broken out. These attempts at self-justification show as much as anything can that the old Cretan revolutionary had developed, that he had become more inclined to counsels of reflection than to the daring of inspiration, and that he counted more on time than on force. They show also that if Mr. Venizelos had not been left to his own resources, he could have triumphed over the king.

Since his second dismissal, Mr. Venizelos has not indulged in any recriminations against the three protecting powers. He has climbed his Calvary without a word of complaint. He is sustained by an invincible patriotic faith. His hope is in the reparations of the future. But the responsibilities of France, England and Russia are none the less great. During an entire year the three Allied Cabinets had meddled in Balkan affairs only to muddle them. They had permitted Turkey to give refuge to the German warships, to close the Dardanelles to commerce and to organize the defense of the straits through the agency of German officers who replaced those of the British naval mission. Then when their friends in Constantinople tricked them, they had been hard put to it to stir up enemies against them. Instead of forming once more against Turkey the league that had in 1913 been so successful against Bulgaria, who was now Turkey's ally, they had persistently offered to Bulgaria the territories of members of this league, especially of Serbia, their ally in fact, and of Greece, their prospective ally. They had compromised the warmest and surest friend that they had in Greece and when this friend, whose support was indispensable to them in the realization of their plans, was attacked by

his sovereign, they deserted him. At the moment when the Anglo-French troops were landing at Saloniki to hasten to the defense of Serbia, France and England suffered the minister who had invited them there to be driven out, and left the fate of the expeditionary force in the hands of a sovereign who had perjured himself. What a strange aberration, and how imprudent!

It was during these early days of October that the fate of Greece and of the Saloniki expedition hung in the balance. The two questions were bound up together. From the 23d of September, the date of the publication of the decree authorizing the Greek mobilization, Mr. Venizelos had requested from the ministers of England and France the dispatch of 150,000 troops intended to replace the same number of troops which Serbia, according to the terms of the treaty of June 3, 1913, had been expected to put in line on her southern frontier in order to benefit by the *casus foederis*. The Cabinets of London and Paris had agreed. Desirous of making amends for their previous errors, they had actively taken the necessary executive measures. Constantine I had sought to avoid responsibility, and Mr. Venizelos on October 2 had had to address a purely formal protest \* to M. Guillemin, who had just notified him of the prospective arrival at Saloniki of a first contingent of French troops. The debarkation began October 5, at 3 P.M.† Mr. Venizelos had handed in his resignation at one o'clock. Is it conceivable that at such a critical moment the Cabinets of London and Paris and their representatives at Athens, forewarned of the hostile intentions of the king, should not have made every effort to minimize their effect? It was of no use to organize a military expedition, if measures were not taken to assure it a friendly reception and free play in the country which was to serve as its

\* "To preserve neutrality up to the time when the *casus foederis* should present itself."

† On October 5 at Karaboroun, and on October 13 at Saloniki.

base of operations. The whole arrangement presupposed, if not the active co-operation of the Greek army, at least the political support of Greece. That being so, how could the originators of the enterprise sit quietly by with their arms folded when Mr. Venizelos was dismissed? If the Cabinets of Paris and of London had acted as energetically as that of Berlin, Mr. Venizelos would have found in their support the strength necessary to checkmate the king. They alleged that they had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign state. This excuse, which the official organs repeated *ad nauseam*, is a wretchedly poor one.

The excuse would not have amounted to anything, even if England, France and Russia had not been bound to Greece by a treaty. As it was, the Greek ministry had just come through general elections which had given it an imposing majority, after a campaign in which its opponents, at that time in power, had taken neutrality as their program and the name of the king for their party-emblem. The country, solemnly consulted by means of a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, had declared itself in favor of political accord with the Triple Entente as against the policy of Mr. Gounaris and the king. According to the Constitution, the government ought to be freely administered by the leader of the victorious party. In once more dismissing this leader from power for the identical reason that had determined his first discharge, the king became guilty of an unfriendly act toward the Entente. He at one and the same time deliberately rebelled against the Constitution and antagonized the three powers who possessed the declared sympathy of the country. These powers found themselves, therefore, quite legitimately on the defensive against the king.

But they possessed another right. In virtue of the treaties of July 6, 1827, February 3, 1830, May 7, 1832, July 13, 1863, and March 29, 1864, they had been made

"protecting powers of Greece," sureties for her independence and her constitution. The treaty of 1863 was especially in point. It had been concluded after the decree of forfeiture had been pronounced against King Otho on account of his misgovernment and anti-constitutional attitude, and had stipulated that the three powers were calling to the Greek throne Prince William of Denmark (George I) in order to realize the wishes of the Greek nation. Article III was thus conceived: "Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the guarantee of the three courts, forms a monarchical, independent, constitutional state." Article X established for the new king a personal endowment consisting of the sum-total of the credits on the Greek treasury which each one of the three courts therewith resigned. In accordance with Article XI the three courts were to see to it that Prince William was recognized as king of the Greeks by all the sovereigns and states with which they were in relations. Never was the right of intervention better established.

In the first days of October, 1915, Constantine I had not yet committed that series of acts outraging the independence and Constitution of Greece which characterized the following eighteen months, but all these acts were latent in the decision of the 5th of October. It was evident that if the king discharged the minister whose policy the electors and the Chamber of Deputies, acting in full cognizance of the case, had just approved, it was done to inaugurate with all its consequences the absolutist régime, which had been repudiated by the treaty of 1863. On ascending the throne Constantine I had pronounced the following oath before the representatives of the people: "I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity, consubstantial and indivisible, to protect the dominant religion of the Greeks, to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Greek nation and to preserve and defend the national independence and integrity



of the Greek state." On the 5th of October he had broken this oath. He had abused the country and its legal representatives. He had compromised the national independence and integrity of the state. Were the protecting powers to delay protesting till the country was crushed under foot, till its independence was suppressed and its integrity violated? It was not only their right but their duty to intervene immediately between the people and the king. Their inertia was in great part the cause of the catastrophies that followed.

Some authorities have claimed that Constantine's *coup-d'état* ought to have determined France and England to abandon the Saloniki expedition rather than to attempt to break down the resistance of the king. This is strange reasoning. These two powers, in accord with Russia, had thought it necessary to go to the rescue of Serbia, their common ally, making use of the territory and the help of Greece, which was also in alliance with Serbia. The treachery of Constantine I rendered this help even more necessary and more urgent. Instead of changing their plan the guaranteeing powers ought to have followed out its execution with redoubled energy. By lowering their flag before the king, by withdrawing from Saloniki the troops that had just arrived, by abandoning Serbia, they would have covered themselves with shame. Furthermore, they would have abandoned all the Orient with its resources and its coasts to Austro-Germany. Right soon they would have been unable to maintain their commerce in the eastern Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal. They knew it. Unfortunately they lacked reasoning power and conscience. They abandoned the Greek people to a despot and trusted to luck.

## PART II

No sooner had Mr. Venizelos been dismissed by the king than the three protecting powers became aware of the consequences of their inaction at the time of the *coup-d'état* of Constantine I. It was no longer a question of the participation of Greece in the hostilities against the Central Powers, but of the execution of the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece. The king had demanded the resignation of Mr. Venizelos on the pretext that as president of the Council of Ministers he had brought Germany and Austria into the case, without being authorized to do so. But the Greco-Serbian treaty subsisted as an indivisible whole, the Chamber had called for its fulfillment and the new government ought to have conformed to the obligations assumed toward Greece's ally and to the express commands of the Chamber. This was so clear that Mr. Zaïmis, the new Prime Minister, did not dare at first to take his stand against it. In appearing before the Chamber on October 11, he did not repudiate Greece's obligations toward Serbia. He simply reserved for himself the power to adapt the policy of Greece to events, "in order better to assure the vital interests of the nation." He even declared that his policy "rested on the same basis as the policy followed by Greece since the beginning of the European war." He said not a word of what he would do if Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria. In fact, he permitted the allies of Serbia to transport their troops over Greek territory in order to help the armies of King Peter. Mr. Venizelos, therefore, did not regard it as his duty to break at once with his successor. He maintained that he did not want to cast the country into internal difficulties and promised to give his support to the government "just

so long as it did not overturn the fundamental principles of the Venizelist policy."

Thus this œcumenical ministry \* could take its place without any opposition and get possession of all the instruments of power without difficulty. On his part the king had a free field for carrying on his negotiations. Thanks to the extreme scrupulousness of Mr. Venizelos and the inertia of the Triple Entente, he cleared without accident the dangerous part of the road which led him toward a dictatorship. From that time he had no need to worry. Master of the staff and the army, freed from all control, he felt himself in a position to resist all parliamentary or constitutional pressure. Furthermore, his prestige was increased by the very success of his authority as exerted. His praises were sung in a tone almost of adoration by a chorus of journalists richly paid by the propaganda of Baron Schenk. Mr. Zaïmis could then, without provoking a new crisis, reject outright the obligation to help Serbia. On the day but one after the session in which Mr. Venizelos had accorded him a provisional parliamentary support, that is, on the 13th of October, he notified Mr. Pachitch that the Greco-Serbian treaty had in view exclusively the hypothesis of an attack by Bulgaria alone, and that owing to the lining up of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Serbia, the treaty no longer applied.

This interpretation, contrary to the actual provisions of the treaty, which established no such distinction, was insulting not only to the Chamber which had expressed the opposite opinion but also to Serbia and to the protecting powers, her allies. The Cabinet of Pachitch drank the bitter cup to the dregs without any recriminations. Probably in the hope that friendly relations with Greece would be resumed later, and in the desire

\* The ministry was thus christened by public opinion because it comprised five former Prime Ministers—Messrs. Zaïmis, Theotokis, Dragoumis, Rhallis and Gounaris.

not to offend a state whose position on her southern border was of great value to her, Serbia did not break off diplomatic relations with the perjured government. It did not even publish the text of the treaty, the divul-gation of which would have exposed the bad faith of the Cabinet of Athens. As for the protecting powers, they flattered themselves that they could win back Constantine I by offering new advantages to him. England offered him as the price of aiding Serbia the cession of the island of Cyprus, which she had held since 1878 in virtue of the treaty concluded June 4 of that year with Turkey. At other times the prospect of acquiring Cyprus, that large island with 285,000 inhabitants of whom 235,000 are Greeks, would have roused the enthusiastic approbation of Greece. Sir Edward Grey in all probability imagined that this would either suffice to bring the king back to their side, or would at least permit public opinion to exert upon him a decisive pressure. He had not correctly estimated the full extent of the damage done by the Entente's weak policy and the success of the German propaganda. Mr. Zaïmis refused in a disdainful way this unexpected gift, which was subject only to the condition that Greece should give military aid to Serbia regardless of what the issue of the war might be. In a note of October 22 to the Cabinet in London he declared that the Austro-German attack released Greece from the obligation to interfere by force of arms, since the treaty of 1913 had had exclusively in view a Balkan war. This refusal is virtually a proof in black and white of the connivance of Constantine I with Germany. That the Greek government did not eagerly jump at the chance to incorporate in its realm such a valuable island as Cyprus must be due to the fact that it had other more alluring promises. According to men in the confidence of Mr. Venizelos \*

\* Interview with Mr. Diomedis, former minister, in the *Gazette de Lausanne*, June 6, 1917.

these promises consisted of an extension of Greek territory in Albania, of the annexation of the Cyclades and of the island of Cyprus. Now, although the fate of Albania depended in some measure on Austria-Germany, that of the Cyclades and of Cyprus depended on the great maritime powers. These would require to have been destroyed, therefore, before the promise of William II could have been fulfilled. But Constantine's faith in the victory of Germany was so strong that he preferred the emperor's two birds in the bush to England's bird in the hand. Without troubling themselves further about the consequences of this situation, France and England pursued in Macedonia the task imposed on them by circumstances.

The Greek Chamber of Deputies, however, took offense almost immediately. The new Minister of War, General Yannakitsas, acted in a way so lacking in respect toward the Chamber that Mr. Venizelos provoked a political debate in the course of which he delivered two great speeches (sitting of the 3d of November, prolonged till 4 A.M. of the 4th). General Yannakitsas having refused to express his regrets, and the Cabinet having rallied to his support in spite of the adverse vote of three of its members, Mr. Venizelos raised the question of a vote of confidence in the government. Unmasking the ministry, he denounced the unconstitutional nature of its power. He maintained that the Greek constitutional monarchy was a republic with a king at its head. As the name of the king had thus been mentioned he explained his position as to the sovereign's intervention in the following words:

I admit as justifiable a disagreement between the Crown and the responsible government when the Crown believes that the latter is not in harmony with the opinion of the people. It was under such conditions that in February, 1915, the change in our policy was made. It was in this spirit that the Crown and the government disagreed in February. But this disagree-

ment was decisively ended by the vote of the people. If you think that the Crown is excusable, according to the spirit of our parliamentary régime, for disregarding this will as expressed by the people in their free elections, free at any rate as far as the manner in which the opposition carried on the contest is concerned, though not free in view of the means employed by the government; if you believe, I say, that the Crown has the right, after appeal has been made to the people and the people has expressed its will, not to follow this expressed will of the people but to proceed to a new dissolution in order to demand the so-called verdict of the people again and again, then this means that you admit that the liberal régime in Greece, under which we have lived for a half-century, has become worse than a scrap of paper, the term which has been used by some people to describe international treaties.

Messrs. Gounaris and Theotokis undertook then to show that the schemes of Mr. Venizelos were leading Greece to her ruin and that the *casus foederis* with Serbia was not applicable. As this was the last sitting of the Chamber and therefore gave Mr. Venizelos his last chance to defend his policy before the legally constituted representatives of the country, it is interesting to reproduce several extracts from his speech which have a historical importance and of which the dispatches from Athens gave at that time an incomplete and obscure analysis. In reply to the charge of having been willing to concede to Bulgaria at the beginning of 1915 the districts of Drama, Cavalla and Seres, he gives the following explanation:

It was a question only of the three districts of Cavalla, Drama and Sari-Chaban, that is to say, of an area of about 2,000 square kilometers. I proposed the cession of these three districts on the following conditions and presuppositions: First: that we should receive the districts of Doïran and of Guevgheli, with an area of 1,000-1,200 square kilometers,—that is, of an extent equaling about half of the territory to be ceded in eastern Macedonia. From the point of view of richness, they were certainly inferior in value, but from a strategical point of view they are of far greater value. Further, our concessions to Bulgaria were made

not in order to purchase Bulgaria's neutrality but to enlist her active help against Turkey, so that she might attack Turkey from Thrace while we would make our attack from the Asia Minor side, thus making the destruction of the Ottoman Empire more rapid.

Further, we were ceding the 2,000 square kilometers on condition that the powers of the Entente should recognize that the vast territorial concessions which they had promised us should have the extent that I outlined in my second communication to the king. . . . If you wish to know the probable area which the cession of Smyrna and the principal part of its hinterland would carry with it, you must take into account that the Hermos and Meander rivers naturally belong to this hinterland and that their valleys reach 275 kilometers into the interior of Asia Minor.

Further, I demanded the appointment of an international commission which would have proceeded to an exchange of populations as soon as the boundaries of Greece and Bulgaria had been definitely traced. Bulgaria, moreover, would have bought the property of such inhabitants of the ceded regions as might have preferred to emigrate to the New Greece, the Greater Greece, which my policy would have created, this policy that you have not followed.

Mr. Theotokis cannot rightfully say, because we were at that time disposed to cede Cavalla and Sari-Chaban, that "a man must be blind not to understand that Bulgaria, if she had received these regions as well as all the Serbian possessions in Macedonia, would have become colossally powerful and dangerous to our existence." For Bulgaria would have received from Serbia only the non-contested zone which was to have reverted to her by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty concluded before the war.

This non-contested zone had an extent of about 10,000 square kilometers. This, added to the 2,000 square kilometers that we would have ceded in eastern Macedonia and the 14,000 square kilometers that she would have received in Thrace by the rectification of the Enos-Midia line, would have made an increase of about 25,000 square kilometers; she would have had then a total area of 140,000 square kilometers. How can you then maintain that this Bulgaria could have been dangerous as ever against a Greece which by her increases of territory in Asia Minor would have had an area of 250,000 square kilometers?

As to the Greco-Serbian treaty, Mr. Venizelos declared that far from having been unwilling to apply it

at the beginning of the war, as his opponents contended, he had come to an agreement with the Cabinet in Belgrade on this point in the month of August, 1914. He affirmed that it was equally inexact to say that Serbia in similar circumstances (in May, 1914) had refused her aid to Greece.\* Passing on, then, to the question of the contingent of 150,000 men that Serbia was bound, by the terms of the treaty, to put in array against Bulgaria in order that the *casus foederis* should come into play, Mr. Venizelos made these two points: 1—France and England had promised to send 150,000 men to take the place of the Serbian contingent; 2—Serbia had herself put in line 120,000 men against Bulgaria, so that taking into account what Serbia alone had done, she lacked only 30,000 men of having fulfilled the stipulation of the treaty. Finally, leaving out of account the interpretation of the treaty, Mr. Venizelos undertook to prove that, treaty or no treaty, Greece ought to hasten to the aid of Serbia.

Mr. Theotokis thinks that the salvation of Greece is to come from the Central Powers. I say to him, with the deepest conviction, that Greece not only cannot grow, but that she cannot even continue to exist within her present confines, if she finds herself opposed to the powers that control the sea. . . . I am justified in telling you to-day that you do not see clearly if you maintain that in case Serbia should be destroyed and Bulgaria should occupy a large part of her territories, it will be easy, regardless of the final result of the war, to dislodge her from the territories that she will have seized. Do you believe that at the close of the European war the peoples that have taken part in this exhausting struggle will for an instant permit their governments to mark the signing of the peace by beginning a new war, a war against Bulgaria to compel her to withdraw her armies from the regions that she claims? I repeat once more that in pursuing your policy you are making sure of only one thing: the creation of a greater Bulgaria which before we shall

\* Later, in his weekly journal, the *Keryx*, Mr. Venizelos told how Mr. Pachitch in May, 1914, had informed the Porte that if war broke out between her and Greece, Serbia would not remain indifferent.



have celebrated the centennial of our independence will rush upon us, weakened militarily and without friends and allies.

Next, Mr. Venizelos compared the two Greeces that were thus in conflict:

We have the former world of Greece represented by the new Cabinet and the new world of Greece, the world of the time following the revolution of 1909, represented by the liberal party. The old conception, which the present Cabinet represents, is that which believed that Greece could not produce an army of more than 60,000 men; it is that which believed that Greece could never contract an alliance that would help her to realize her national aspirations; it is the Greece whose views about our national aspirations were nebulous, and as undecided as they were indefinite; it is the Greece whose preparations were as insignificant as its aspirations were magnificent. We did not then realize how far our just and legitimate aspirations might extend. We let them reach so far oftentimes that statesmen who were content with extending them only as far as Kroussovo were accused by us of betraying the rights of Hellenism.

It is, then, natural that to-day too, when once more circumstances analogous to those of 1912 present themselves, it is natural, I say, that our political conceptions should be as far removed from each other as are the poles. Now as then, you do not wish a war which necessitates the help of allies, and when I tell you that the cup has not been finally taken from you, that it will be brought again to your lips that you may drink it to the dregs, you say, "Well, it is your fault, for having brought us as far as the Nestos." \* [Applause.]

Do you not think, then, gentlemen, that the New Greece is justified in saying to the Old Greece: "In the presence of the great difficulties which are before us, you ought once more to step aside and to give place to the New Greece which has the courage necessary to meet the new situation." [Shouts of "Bravo!" and prolonged applause.]

By 147 votes against 114, with three blank ballots, the Chamber adopted the program of the liberal party, judging the declarations of the government unsatisfactory and censuring the conduct of the Minister of War.

\* The river Mesta, which empties into the sea in the district of Cavalla.

The first move of the king was to appoint General Yannakitsas his aide-de-camp. Then he accepted the resignation of Mr. Zaïmis and charged with the formation of the new Cabinet a Mr. Scouloudis, an octogenarian who had served in the ministry only once, and then for but five months, when in 1897 he had been minister with the portfolio of foreign affairs in Mr. Rallis' Cabinet. Mr. Scouloudis took this portfolio once more into his own hands and retained most of the members of Mr. Zaïmis' Cabinet, including Mr. Gounaris and General Yannakitsas. The only new colleague whose co-operation he secured was Mr. Michelidakis, a Cretan, and an obstinate rival of Mr. Venizelos. This series of acts constituted a declaration of war on the Chamber, the liberal party and Mr. Venizelos. It was followed by a decree of dissolution of the Chamber. In one month Greece had reached the last stage on the road toward absolutism.

The royalists concealed the sinister aspects of this evolution as well as they could. According to their views the Constitution conferred on the king, without any limitation, the power to dismiss his ministers and to dissolve the Chamber. Consequently Constantine I kept within the limits of the Constitution in changing his ministers and dissolving the Chamber as often as he thought necessary. In fact, the Greek Constitution contained no reservations as to the exercise of the power to dismiss ministers or to dissolve the Chamber. But this is the case generally in all parliamentary governments. Custom corrects textual omissions. No text can settle in advance all the clashes that may possibly arise between the different branches of the government. If the power to change the Cabinet and to dissolve Parliament were actually unlimited, a constitutional régime would be equivalent to a government at the king's good pleasure. In the last resort, it is the people who decide; that is to say, when the sovereign makes use of his pre-

rogatives in a way that is obviously contrary to the spirit of the government the people makes known its will by effective measures. This had been done in Greece in 1863, as in France in 1830. Nothing of the sort took place at Athens in November, 1915, because the leader of the majority did not wish it and the protecting powers did not encourage it. In November the difficulty of triumphing over the king was greater than in October. The leader of the last legitimate government no longer controlled any of the elements of public power; they were all in the hands of his opponents. It was then only logical that, having yielded in October, he should yield again in November. In politics events are irresistibly linked up one with another.

The same logic compelled the three protecting powers to trust the formal protestations of friendship made by the king and his ministers. Mr. Scouloudis certainly did his duty along this line. In a note of November 9, addressed to the Entente Powers, he gave them "the most formal assurances of his firm resolve to continue a most sincerely benevolent neutrality" toward them. "The new Cabinet," he added, "adopts as its own the declarations of Mr. Zaïmis as to the attitude of the royal government in its relation to the Allied troops in Saloniki. It is too fully conscious of the true interests of the country and of what it owes to the protecting powers to depart in the slightest degree from this line of conduct." At the same time the confidential representatives of Constantine I in the capitals of the Entente were telling all who were willing to listen to them that the king had been misjudged, and that from now on all that was needed to establish the most perfect harmony between the court of Athens and the Entente was to rid him of Mr. Venizelos. It was on the basis of these fair words that the Anglo-French force that had landed at Saloniki a month earlier began operations in Macedonia.

Gloomy months followed. While our expeditionary force spent itself in vain efforts to help the Serbians, driven back by superior forces, the royal dictatorship extended its hold over all Greece. The protecting powers raised no protest. Their excuse was that they desired to avoid interfering with the internal affairs of Greece. Constantine I heaped compliments and marks of favor on such members of the French and English governments as visited Athens. M. Denys Cochin and Lord Kitchener were successively the recipients of signs of friendship. And yet, notwithstanding all this, less than fifteen days after his appointment Mr. Scouloudis announced his intention to disarm and intern Allied troops, whether Serbian or Anglo-French, who might be driven back on to Greek territory. Emboldened by unexpected complacency or even by encouraging confidential statements on the part of personages of the Entente who were opposed to the Macedonian enterprise, he pretended to apply strictly in the matter the ordinary rules of neutrality. It required "commercial restrictions" and a threatening note in order to recall him to a sense of respect for Greece's obligations and his own promises of November 9. On the 24th of November, after a painful discussion, he consented to permit the Allied troops liberty of movement and the use of the necessary ways and means of transport. One of the members of the Cabinet, however, characterized this agreement very exactly in the following words: "The matter has been happily arranged, thanks to the broad views of Germany, who has kindly consented not to place any obstacles in the way of our benevolent neutrality toward the Entente." In Greece, then, the Allies benefited no longer by the benevolence of Greece but by that of Germany! William II advised Constantine to be patient till such time as the armies of these two brothers-in-law could together fall upon ours.

There was no election campaign. Mr. Venizelos

requested his friends not to run for office and advised the electors not to vote. According to his idea, abstaining from voting was the only way for the liberal party to show its strength. As a matter of fact, half of the voters were under arms, including fifty-three Venizelist deputies. The government was ready to give furloughs to its supporters while withholding them from its opponents. This consulting of the electorate was, then, a downright farce, and those elected were not even sure of being allowed to take their seats, because this depended on authorization by the military powers. If the liberals participated in the balloting the government would not hesitate to maintain that the people had ratified its policy. It was better to leave to the old parties, illegally returned to power, the responsibility for events. At a meeting of the liberal party held at his house November 21 Mr. Venizelos had this policy adopted, and on the same day published an explanatory manifesto of which these were the closing words:

The government wishes to play a political comedy unworthy of a free people. It is in a spirit of mockery that it has called this an expression of the national will. This political comedy is really intended to prevent the expression of the national will by means of a dishonest election, and to cause it to be believed that the Greek people could not only countenance the disgrace of the non-fulfillment of a treaty of alliance, which has made it possible for Greece to extend its frontiers as far as the Nestos, but also could approve of the degradation of our political régime and the estrangement of the natural friends of Greece. In a comedy like this, I say, the liberal party is in duty bound to take no part, in order not to lend an appearance of legality to this action which ought, in conformity with the facts of the case, to be denounced as a violation of constitutional law and morality.

The liberal party, in thus refusing to participate in the elections, does not abandon politics nor withdraw from the struggle. On the contrary, by this abstention, it continues to participate in political affairs. It leaves to the government, which has brought us into this situation, full and entire responsibility for

the deterioration of our political régime and for the disasters which this policy is bringing upon the nation. At the same time, our party is also trying to avoid other dangers likely to result from an internal struggle, which might quickly become acute, now that we are in the midst of an external crisis as well.

When this external crisis shall have passed, if the disasters that the policy of the government is preparing for us do not assume such proportions as to shatter our faith in the future of Hellenism, the liberal party will be ready to undertake the struggle into which the country is forced in order to defend its constitutional liberty.

No matter how acute this future struggle may be, it will be continued then under conditions less dangerous than those under which it would be carried on to-day when we are in the midst of the most dangerous national crisis that we have ever experienced.

The restoration of their liberties to the Greek people will be the one indispensable condition of the safety of the state. This alone can preserve her from wasting away and dying an inglorious death, the end toward which the definitive establishment of despotism in our country would surely lead.

On the 19th of December, the day of the election, only 200,000 citizens voted although the voters of the 13th of June had numbered 750,000. This was a little less than one-fifth of the registered voters. And yet the government had used a veritable wealth of means of compulsion: suspension of the rule that certain employees could not be removed, the discharge of men in office, the distribution of lands to the Mohammedans of Macedonia, threats to the directors and editors of the newspapers of the opposition, espionage, infringements on the right to assemble and so forth. It was this Chamber, thus elected, which served as a shield to Constantine's despotical government.

Indeed, the king delegated all his powers to his military council, presided over by General Dousmanis, to whom the Cabinet ministers served simply as tools. With the co-operation of the military attaché of Germany the staff prepared the eventual co-operation of the Greek army with the German-Bulgarians coming

from the north. German pamphlets were gratuitously and profusely distributed in the barracks, where, on the contrary, the reading of liberal journals was forbidden under heaviest penalties. Volunteers recruited in the 1st regiment of the army corps of Athens, of which the Crown Prince was colonel, formed a sort of royal body guard and served as an agency of propaganda. The army was withdrawn from its military duty in order to be employed for political purposes. In 1909 Mr. Venizelos had adopted precisely the opposite method. Though called to Greece by the Military League, he had shortly afterwards proceeded to dissolve it and had sent the army back to its professional duties. He had put an end to anarchy and had prevented civil war by sending each man back to his place and by substituting an ordered democracy for a oligarchy governed by demagogues. Constantine I brought back disorder, prepared the way for civil war, cut the country in two internally and delivered its frontiers to an enemy beyond its gates. The Cretan revolutionary acted as a statesman, while the king behaved like a revolutionary.\*

\* The *Keryx*, in the month of June, after the crisis was past, described the situation as it had existed. as follows:

"The attempt was made to strangle the national soul and to inspire abject terror by any means whatsoever, in order that the people might bow before the deadly results of the policy employed. Whole armies of spies and intriguers were formed, with all their elements eager to sell their very souls. Citizens who had no interest in politics were followed both openly and secretly by detectives without being able to imagine what political calumny was being hatched against them. Those who met in the public centers of the two cities did not dare to ask each other for the news of the day, in the certainty that among the strangers about them were base spies whose business it was to weave slanderous plots. Those who took places at tables in cafés and confectioners' shops looked around in a frightened way and beheld the respectable person, who was about to sit down beside them, listening to their conversation and addressing them with insolent frankness with the intention of provoking a discussion, and of crying out to these innocent citizens that they were insulting the king.

"The most respectable citizens were dragged before the courts on slanderous charges, those who dared to blame the conduct of the government received menacing letters in which they were warned to look out for their lives. Automobiles and carriages were stopped and their occupants asked who they were, where they came from and whither they were going. In front of many houses detectives were placed keeping count of those who entered or passed out, following like 'faithful' dogs every movement of the occupants. Men

The real nature of that "most sincerely benevolent" neutrality, promised by the Scouloudis Cabinet, was shown at once by the ill-treatment of the conquered Serbians, who had succeeded in escaping from the Germano-Bulgarian grip. In order to anticipate the effects of this ill-will, warships of the Allied fleet on January 10, 1916, landed some detachments at Corfu and prepared to receive there the wreck of the Serbian army which had taken refuge on the Albanian coast. By a note of that same day the representatives of the Allied powers informed Mr. Scouloudis of this measure dictated by "a feeling of pure humanity." Reluctantly, Mr. Scouloudis yielded to the inevitable, but he took his revenge by concluding with Bulgaria an arrangement, the existence of which was later revealed by the Hungarian newspaper *Az Est*, which published the following Bulgarian note:

Since the capture of Bitolia (Monastir) and of Resna the Bulgarian army has approached close to the Greek frontier. In consequence of this movement the general staff of Bulgaria is afraid that on the frontier collisions may easily arise between the outposts of the Bulgarian army and those of the Greeks.

Desirous of avoiding the possibility of such accidents the Bulgarian government invites the Greek government to consent to the creation of a neutral zone on the Greco-Serbian frontier *as has been already done on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier* and to be willing that along the Greek frontier the troops be withdrawn on both sides for the distance of a gun-shot.

Some weeks later, in April, the government of Athens flatly refused to let the Serbian troops who had been kindly received at Corfu, and who had now recovered

of all sorts and of the most peaceful character were searched for hidden weapons, while right before them passed quite openly the minions of the government. Every hangman was armed, every individual that would sell himself was bought, every man devoid of conscience was recruited for this work of espionage, calumny and perfidy. The times of Turkish despotism knew no more dangerous organizations. Janissarism lived once more in a different form."



from their trials and had been equipped afresh, to rejoin the Anglo-French expeditionary force in Macedonia by passing over Greek territory or through the Corinthian Canal. It alleged that the passage of the Serbian soldiers would endanger public health, would interfere with the passenger and freight traffic, would violate the neutrality of Greece and menace its independence. The first two objections were in fact unfounded. The third had only an apparent value. As a matter of fact, even if Greece was neutral in the European conflict, she was Serbia's ally in virtue of the treaty of 1913. The alliance was not destroyed by the refusal to give the help provided for by the treaty. The Cabinet of Belgrade had carefully avoided regarding this refusal as a rupture. It did not despair of being able to bring Greece back to the feeling that it was its duty to defend the common interests of the two countries. Now, over and above the auxiliary force of 150,000 men, the treaty of June, 1913, provided for facilitating the transportation of troops of each of the signatory states through the territories of the other. If the ministers of Constantine I had really been animated toward the Allies by the sentiments expressed in their note of the 9th of November, they would have hastened to give them this permission which would have cost Greece nothing and would have formed a poor compensation for their failure to fulfill the clause as to giving aid. As for the menace to her national independence, this was chimerical. It was evident that the Serbian troops would hasten away to Macedonia without delaying in Old Greece. Besides, the route through the Corinthian Canal obviated this pretended danger.

Mr. Scouloudis' ill-will was equaled by his bad faith. This first showed itself in the month of May. On the 23d of this month a column of Germano-Bulgarian troops appeared before Fort Rupel at the entrance of the Demir-Hissar Pass and summoned the Greek gar-

rison to surrender, declaring that they had been ordered to penetrate into Greek territory "in order to occupy certain advantageous positions." The occupants of the fort at first refused. They even fired twenty-four cannon shots against the invaders, but during the night they received the order to withdraw. In the Chamber, on June 5, Mr. Scouloudis thus explained this order: "Being aware on the one hand of the resolve of the invaders to seize the fort and seeing on the other hand that a continued armed resistance might at any moment lead to a general engagement which would result in breaking a neutrality that it had no intention of abandoning, the government issued the following order through the Minister of War: 'First to cease all resistance, and then to declare to the German commander that in view of the general invasion of the German army in the pass of Demir-Hissar, where the fort is, the garrison of the fort is obliged to retire, taking with it the war material in the fort.'"

The explanation was very pretty. In order not to depart from neutrality—always the same old excuse—the Greek government let the Bulgarians, its irreconcilable enemies, seize its territories and occupy a group of newly built fortifications, the construction of which had cost relatively large amounts of money. Mr. Scouloudis declared before the Chamber that he had protested most energetically to Germany and her allies, and he also launched out into pompous denials of the suspected understanding with the Germano-Bulgarians. And yet, this understanding actually did exist. This was proven by documents found later in the military offices of the IVth army corps and published in facsimile. Although at that time this was only a suspicion, several deputies of this shadowy chamber murmured. As a sort of relief for their irritation, Mr. Scouloudis announced that on the Saturday before, June 3, the king's fête-day, General Sarraïl had proclaimed martial

law in Saloniki and that the Greek government had at once protested. Thereupon, Mr. Stratos expressed his opinion that all the stir about the occupation of the Rupel Pass was unjustified and that the proclamation of martial law at Saloniki was of far greater importance. He ended by saying that Mr. Venizelos had had in view only the aggrandizement of Bulgaria. A deputy named Mitropoulos shouted "Cannot the man guilty of such crimes be prosecuted?" Mr. Stratos demanded that a prosecuting attorney should be called on to act. That was the way this Rump Parliament made Mr. Venizelos responsible for the capture of the Rupel forts.

Public opinion did not take the thing so calmly. The Macedonians were disturbed. Patriots who were not blinded by hatred for Venizelos and abject devotion to the king were startled at the spectacle of their enemies of 1912-13 firmly established in the lands won by the victories of these two glorious years. They recalled to Constantine I that he had then won the title of Bulgar Slayer and repeated his dispatch to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent on the 25th of June, 1913:

Urgent dispatch of His Majesty, the King, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

June 25.

The sixth division reports that Bulgarian soldiers, at the command of a police officer, led into the courtyard of the local Bulgarian school the Metropolitan of Demir-Hissar, two priests and more than two hundred prominent citizens and massacred them there. The division staff ordered the bodies exhumed and established the fact of the crime. The Bulgarians, furthermore, violated girls and killed one girl who resisted.

Protest, by my order, before the representatives of the civilized powers against these monsters with human faces. Protest before the civilized world and declare that I shall find myself forced, to my regret, to proceed to reprisals in order to inspire some fear or some reflection as to consequences before crimes like these are perpetrated.

The acts of the Bulgarians have made all the atrocities of past barbarian invasions fade into insignificance. They prove that the Bulgarians no longer have the right to be included among civilized peoples.

CONSTANTINE R.

If Constantine I showed himself perfectly reassured as to these people whom he had three years before banished from the civilized world, the Allies did not share these sentiments. The right wing of their expeditionary force was menaced. The bulk of the army could be attacked on the flank at a moment when it might be engaged in a serious operation in the northwest. Furthermore, the Bulgarians were not the only ones to inspire apprehensions. The connivance of the Scouloudis Cabinet with them furnished ground for apprehension. Toward the end of May, General Yannakitsas warned his troops that they might soon be called on to fight. But against whom, pray, since Greece was maintaining a strict neutrality? Some days later at the close of a review of troops who had taken part in the grand manoeuvres, the king made an address in which he said: "Soldiers ought to be obedient to orders, not to sentiments." Further, Constantine I on the pretext of going hunting went on an excursion of six days in upper Thessaly in the vicinity of that Albano-Epirote region where the Austrian troops were operating. The tone of his speeches, his manner, and his actions themselves should have warned us to be on our guard. On the 12th of June "popular" manifestations against France and England took place in the capital. Since these powers had neglected to act at the moment when a decisive result might easily have been obtained, they were now forced by necessity to take effective precautions against an imminent danger. They at once organized a landing force under the orders of Admiral Moreau and transported it to the Bay of Salamis. Though the instructions given to the admiral and the representatives

of the Entente in Athens have never been divulged, there is reason to believe that the intention of the protecting powers was to settle the Greek affair with one stroke and to re-establish in its integrity the constitutional régime with appropriate material guarantees. Unfortunately, at the last moment, these intentions were modified. Either owing to some diplomatic intervention or because Constantine I, warned of the blow that was threatening him, took the first steps toward submission, the ministers of the three protecting powers contented themselves with sending Mr. Scouloudis on the 21st of June an ultimatum. This document was in truth unusually curt. After having called attention to the "many legitimate grounds for suspecting the Greek government," to the activities of foreigners who were trying to create on Greek territory hostile organizations contrary to the neutrality of the country and tending to compromise the security of the military and naval forces of the Allies, to the connivance of the Greek Cabinet with the Germano-Bulgarians in the Rupel affair, to the violation of the Greek constitution and the evident "collusion of the present Cabinet with their enemies," the protecting powers demanded the immediate execution, without discussion or delay, of the following measures:

1. The actual and total demobilization of the Greek army, which must be put, with the briefest delay, on a peace footing.
2. That the present ministry should be at once replaced by a business Cabinet without political color which should offer all necessary guarantees for the loyal fulfillment of that benevolent neutrality toward the Allied powers that Greece had promised to observe, and should vouch for the honesty of new elections.
3. An immediate dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, followed by new elections, after the expiration of the time-limit provided by the Constitution and after the general demobilization should have restored the electoral body to its normal state.
4. The replacing, after consultation with the Allies, of certain police functionaries whose attitude, inspired by foreign influences, had facilitated outrages committed against peaceable

citizens, as well as insults directed at the Allied legations and people under their jurisdiction.

The king submitted. Many of those who were privy to these negotiations supposed, nay hoped, that he would prefer to abdicate rather than to submit to such mortifying conditions. If he had been guided by motives originating in a feeling of wounded self-respect, he would probably have given up the struggle from this moment. But without any doubt he was advised by William II to bend the neck and to keep his throne while waiting for better times. So he dismissed the docile Mr. Scouloudis and charged Mr. Zaïmis with the duty of forming a new Cabinet. It was Mr. Zaïmis who, on June 23, signed the promise to execute in their entirety the demands formulated in the ultimatum of the 21st. On the 29th of June the general demobilization was decreed, and on the 31st of July the army was once more put on a peace footing. Many functionaries were replaced or discharged, but the Chamber was not discharged, under the pretext that it was impossible, because of circumstances, to decide at that time, as the Constitution demanded, the date of the coming elections. The Chamber was, therefore, simply adjourned. General Dousmanis and Mr. Streit, the two secret advisers of the king, continued to hold their positions. The pro-Entente newspapers were prosecuted for having "defamed and insulted the government and the army," when as a matter of fact they had at that time been indulging in the gentlest sort of criticism. The very life of Mr. Venizelos was threatened, so that he was obliged to protect himself with a body-guard of his faithful Cretans. This did not, however, hinder him from energetically conducting his electoral campaign in view of the great national election that was approaching. The magnificent resistance at Verdun, the Franco-British success on the Somme, the victorious offensive of General Broussilof in Galicia and Bukovina

gave to his electioneering a turn that was very disquieting to the royalists.

Constantine I resolved at that time on an act that will eternally weigh heavily on his reputation. Fearing, in spite of an unbridled anti-Venizelist propaganda, and the formation of leagues of reservists who put force at the disposal of the election agents of the government, fearing, I say, that the Venizelists would be returned in large majority to the new Chamber, the king wished at any price to postpone the elections indefinitely. To achieve this end he contrived the invasion of eastern and western Macedonia by the Germano-Bulgarians. Descending the valley of the Strouma, the Bulgarians seized all the ports of the valley and the cities of Drama, Seres and Cavalla. They carried away the garrisons and had them transported to Germany. They got possession of war material consisting of 200 cannon of the latest model, 50,000 rifles, great stores of ammunition and different kinds of equipment, etc. The Greek troops had received definite orders not to resist the Bulgarians and to enter into no common action with the French. Those who did not wish to submit to the humiliation of internment were obliged to take refuge as best they could within the radius of action of the expeditionary force of the Allies. Out of 4,500 men and 200 officers of the garrison of Cavalla, 2,200 soldiers and about 120 officers with Colonels Christodoulou and Lelakis crossed over to the island of Thasos; 700 men with 40 officers set sail for the Pireus; the rest with Colonel Hadjopoulos who commanded the 6th division were directed by the Bulgarians toward Drama. In the localities that they seized the Bulgarians gave themselves up to the most savage acts of violence against the inhabitants, who, since their precipitate departure in 1918, had been described to them as hostile.\*

\* These events took place in the interval between the 20th of August and the beginning of September.

This time the measure had been heaped full to overflowing. It was no longer a matter of a difference of opinion about the Constitution; it was a clear case of treason. Constantine I accepted as a satisfactory guarantee on the part of the invaders the assurance from the ministers of Germany and Bulgaria in Athens that Greek sovereignty would be respected, that the German and Bulgarian troops would evacuate the Greek territory thus occupied as soon as military conditions would permit, and that the inhabitants would be indemnified for all the damage caused. A vigorous movement of protestation took place at once. On Monday, the 27th of August, an immense crowd gathered before Mr. Venizelos' house to cheer for the leader of the liberal party. Mr. Venizelos addressed these 60,000 citizens and proposed to them to elect a delegation which should submit to the king a stirring appeal of which he then and there read the text. He did not break with the monarch; he only entreated him to return to a sense of his obligations as king. On this point, the peroration of his address was particularly significant: "You will see, O King, by the meeting of to-day that the liberal party is not the enemy of the Crown any more than it is of the royal family; nor is it your personal enemy. It is only the respectful guardian of free government and admits no deviation on this point. But just here, too, lies the real interest of the Crown. Only those who exploit the latter can seek to persuade you of the contrary and they are then really your worst enemies." But Constantine I had no intention of receiving a delegation of liberals or of replying to their appeal. He announced that he was ill, and that the publication of the decree of dissolution of the Chamber and of convocation of the electors would have to be delayed for some time longer. During this illness, real or pretended, events came on thick and fast. The intrigues of the German agents assumed such proportions and the acts of the governmental functionaries



were so hostile to the Entente that on September 1 a strong Franco-British squadron, under the orders of Admiral Dartige du Fournet, commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, came to anchor in the harbor of Salamis. On the 2d the ministers of France and England demanded control of the postal, telegraph and wireless communications, the expulsion of hostile agents of corruption and espionage, and penalties for the Greek subjects who had participated in the acts of corruption and espionage above described. Mr. Zaïmis could do nothing else but yield. The disorders, nevertheless, kept on increasing. The leagues of reservists organized meetings of protest against the demands of the Entente. On the 10th of September a band of about twenty-five persons made their way into the garden of the French Legation, and discharged their pistols in the air, shouting, "Long live the king! Down with France!" Mr. Zaïmis had to present his regrets to M. Guillemin, and have them presented at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris by Mr. Romanos. He was obliged to guarantee the infliction of penalties upon the guilty men and to promise to close at once the various sections of the League of Reservists both in Athens and in the provinces.

However, the Bulgarian invasion cut the Greek army in two materially and morally. The soldiers who had escaped from eastern Macedonia and almost the entire garrison of Saloniki formed themselves into an army for national defense and put themselves at General Sarrail's disposal to resist the Bulgarians. A committee for national defense, at the head of which was Colonel Zymbracakis, addressed a proclamation to the people in order to incite them "to cease to obey the authorities who had betrayed the national honor," and another proclamation to the army to urge it to place itself under the orders of the committee with a view to the liberation of the fatherland. These appeals found numerous echoes.

Furious at what he called a defection, the king received in solemn audience the officers of the 5th division (Saloniki) who had refused to make common cause with their comrades of the national defense and he congratulated them emphatically: "You have inscribed your names in the annals of history with a pen of iron. You have shown an example of an iron discipline, of a faith and devotion toward your king and your leader that is proof against every test. By your attitude you have stigmatized as traitors those who have betrayed their oath and among whom, unfortunately, your commanding officer is counted. . . . With such an army and at the head of men like you, possessing your morale, your sentiments and your faith, I am ready to face no matter what enemy." As the officers thus congratulated had been unwilling to fight the Germano-Bulgarians, this "no matter what enemy" that the king had in mind could only be the expeditionary force of the Entente.

In spite of so many disturbing indications, Mr. Venizelos still clung to the hope of winning the king back to the national cause. Rumania had declared war on Austria-Hungary on the 28th of August, an event of great importance to Europe, but of especial importance to Greece. For more than a year General Dousmanis himself had said that the moment Rumania entered the war Greece would be obliged to do the same. Without doubt, he did not believe that King Ferdinand, a Hohenzollern, would turn against Germany, but the opinion that he expressed was a political necessity so evident that Mr. Venizelos thought that he ought to make a supreme effort. He describes the steps he took in the following terms: \*

I informed Mr. Zaïmis that if the king, contrary to what his courtiers had declared, was still unwilling to side with the Entente, he would prove by this very act, before the whole world,

\* Interview given March 13, 1917, to the special envoy of the Havas Agency.

that he was following a pro-German and not a Greek policy, and I added that I should in that case consider it my duty to revolt.

Mr. Zaïmis, on the basis of this declaration and appealing to the signs of impatience and even of disorder that began to show themselves in the army, obtained from the king his promise to enter upon negotiations with the nations of the Entente looking to an emergence from her neutrality. The king even authorized him to put himself in touch with me so as to keep me informed of all the negotiations as they occurred.

But meanwhile the German Emperor telegraphed to the king to assure him that within a month he would certainly have conquered all Rumania and have thrown Sarraïl's army into the sea. He asked him, therefore, to resist the Venizelist policy for four weeks more. With all docility the king obeyed, yielding to the injunctions of his brother-in-law, and ten days after he had seemed to be about to side with the powers of the Entente he threw aside the mask and returned to his self-willed policy.

Mr. Zaïmis, realizing that he was being mocked, refused to play the king's game and resigned. The moment to act had come; the country had seen light; the king never would move.

Admiral Coundouriotis, disheartened by such criminality, joined me along with General Danglis, and we decided at once to raise the standard of revolt.

Mr. Zaïmis handed in his resignation as Prime Minister on the 11th of September. In spite of the solicitations of Messrs. Gounaris and Rhallis, he persisted in his refusal to serve, and it was very difficult for the king to find a successor. He did not dare to recall Mr. Gounaris, his confidential adviser, whose nomination would have constituted a violation of Article II of the ultimatum of June 21. And yet he had to have someone who, under the cloak of neutrality, should ruin the Venizelist policy within and without the country. By the mediation of Mr. Streit, his unofficial Minister of Foreign Affairs, he at once offered the position with this understanding to Mr. Dimitracopoulos. But the latter, upon ascertaining that it would be impossible for him to maintain his position owing to the refusal of the ministers of the Entente to withdraw their insistence on the execution of the conditions of the ultimatum of

June 21, resigned the office. Several days were spent in new efforts. Finally, on the 16th of September, Mr. Nicolas Calogeropoulos, former associate of Mr. George Theotokis and conspicuous member of the aristocratic Germanophile coterie, formed a ministry composed of second-rate men who were notorious anti-Venizelists. His personal sentiments were well known. In June, 1915, he had been heard to say publicly, while speaking of the leader of the liberal party: "We must have this traitor's blood."

The formation of this Cabinet was a challenge to the Entente. The ministers of the protecting powers refused to have anything to do with it. When questioned about this, Mr. Calogeropoulos replied: "According to diplomatic custom, immediately after the formation of the Cabinet, the foreign representatives visit the Prime Minister. If this takes place, in common courtesy, we shall immediately return the visit." The expected visit did not take place. Then Mr. Calogeropoulos published the following communication: "The declarations which have been made by the Prime Minister and in accordance with which the present government is not a Cabinet in the ordinary sense of the word, but has a political character, must be understood as follows: the ministry, composed of persons belonging to the Parliament, assumes before the country all responsibility for its acts, accepting, be it understood, the note of the powers of June 21 in the same spirit as did the Zaïmis Cabinet." In spite of this express acceptance of the ultimatum of June 21, the ministers of the Entente persisted in holding aloof. The tension reached its height. From all the larger islands of the Cyclades came manifestos, approved by large assemblies, urging Constantine I to recall Mr. Venizelos without delay and threatening in case of refusal to establish a revolutionary government. These demonstrations did not shake the king's resolve. Their only effect was to render him more insolent.

On the 20th of September, before the infantry barracks of Athens and in the presence of 5,000 soldiers gathered for the ceremony of administering the oath to the new recruits, the king delivered a speech breathing the purest absolutism. He declared to the young soldiers that they were from now on "soldiers of the king," that they owed a blind devotion "to the will of the king," and he warned them not to yield to suggestions intended to mislead them: "Do not listen," he cried, "to the advice of the profiteers of patriotism, since for them patriotism is only a screen behind which they hide in order to commit crimes." These were the very words of William II. "*Voluntas regis suprema lex esto.*"

On the next day, *Patris*, the organ of Mr. Venizelos, characterized this speech as contrary to the fundamental principles of the Constitution, surpassing the very worst conceptions of absolutism. Mr. Venizelos himself declared publicly that the nation ought at once to take the defense of its interests into its own hands.

On the 22d, Colonel Zymbracakis reviewed on the parade ground of Saloniki the contingents of Macedonian volunteers who were ready to join the army of Sarraïl. The same day, Mr. Calogeropoulos decided to institute lawsuits against all the officers, non-commissioned officers and private soldiers "who had adhered to the revolutionary movement." On the 24th, the Congress of Hellenic Colonies assembled in Paris pronounced the deposition of King Constantine. On the 25th, at half-past four in the morning, Mr. Venizelos, accompanied by Admiral Coundouriotis, commander-in-chief of the Greek navy and a group of friends, set sail from Phalerum for Crete. Received with enthusiasm at Canea by the people and by the troops he issued a proclamation to the Greek people. After describing the disorders resulting from the fatal policy of the king during the last year and a half, he concluded:

It is not the time now to try to find those who are responsible for our accumulated misfortunes. The duty imposed on us is to try, while there is still time, to save what can be saved. The surest way to find safety would certainly be to re-establish our broken national unity, in order that this work may be undertaken with the co-operation of all the nation's forces.

But there is only one possible means of re-forming this broken national unity. It is to return without delay to the policy which the national conscience dictates; it is to attempt at the side of our Serbian allies and of the great powers who are battling with them, three of whom are guarantors of our independence, to free our territory from the invasion of this detested enemy; it is to co-operate with these powers so that not only shall Europe be finally and forever freed from the danger of the German hegemony, but that the Balkans too may be freed from Bulgarian pretensions to supremacy.

We shall count ourselves happy if the king decides, at this supreme moment, to put himself at the head of the national forces, so that, in an indissoluble union, we may attempt the realization of this national policy. But if this cannot be obtained, there remains but one means of safety, that is, the isolated action of that part of the nation which believes that if we do not co-operate with our natural allies in the re-creation of the Orient which is bound to result from the great European war, the Greek government and the Greek nation will go down to ruin.

For this reason taking on ourselves, with a feeling of duty but also with enthusiasm, the mission entrusted to us by the people, we appeal to all Hellenism and demand its help in the work that we are undertaking. Since the government has betrayed its obligations, it is incumbent upon the nation to attempt the realization of the task imposed upon it. We invoke the support of every Greek citizen who feels that a longer tolerance of the disasters and humiliations which the policy which we have followed has caused, would be equivalent to the death of the nation.

We undertake this struggle in the full conviction that the nation, summoned, in the defection of the State, to a rising in mass, will realize once more the miracle which is necessary to bring the nation back to the way from which it has wandered for a year and a half.

Immediately, adherents flocked to the cause. In all the larger islands of the Cyclades, the royalist authori-

ties were deposed and replaced by Venizelists. From Athens itself many officers, followed by non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, set sail for Saloniki. The committee for national defense put itself entirely at the disposal of the government that was forming. The permanent bureau (in Paris) of the Congress of Greek Colonies sent a telegram of adherence to Mr. Venizelos, promising to follow him "on the path of honor and glory" to which he had committed the Greek race. From Canea, Messrs. Venizelos and Coundouriotis sent to M. Briand, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, a dispatch congratulating him on the recent success of the French troops on the Somme and containing warm wishes for the final success of the Allies. It was the first contact of the provisional government with a foreign government. M. Briand thanked the signers of the telegram through the consul of France at Canea.

The miracle, the vision of which guided Mr. Venizelos over the waters of the Archipelago, was accomplished at this moment. New Greece, becoming the guardian of the sacred fire of the fatherland, peacefully conquered the Old, and Hellas began to believe once more in her destiny.

### PART III

THE departure of Mr. Venizelos for Canea gave rise to curious and diverse comments. While it was generally interpreted in France, in England and especially in New Greece and the islands as the beginning of a patriotic campaign destined to produce great results, the circles devoted to the king affected to regard it as a confession of weakness, if not as a flight. We may even question whether the government in Athens did not actually look on this move with favor, in the hope that the prestige of the leader of the liberal party would vanish with his departure from the capital. The friends of the Royal Family in Greece as well as elsewhere were inclined to compare his departure to that of General Boulanger for Brussels in 1889. . . . Did Mr. Calogeropoulos wish to pose as the Greek Constant? Certain it is that he permitted the news to spread that co-operation of Greece with the Entente was again possible. He demanded only, so it was said, a definite period of delay, so as to permit the reorganization of the military forces of the country before involving it in the war. Even the attitude of the protecting powers toward this move on the part of Mr. Venizelos was not very clearly defined. It soon appeared that their support of him, a support that was absolutely necessary if he was to succeed in his enterprise, had been subordinated to the condition that this should not take the form of an antidynastic movement.\* Now, in order to produce its full effect the movement ought to have started upon the arrival of the liberal leaders at Canea, with a proclamation deposing the king, or at least with the convocation, in a city removed from

\* Mr. Venizelos declared later, in 1917, that this condition had actually been imposed upon him.



royalist control, either of the Chamber that had been illegally dissolved or of an assembly of delegates from all parts of free Greece. Embarrassed by the engagement that he had been forced to make, Mr. Venizelos was obliged to restrain the demonstrations of his followers instead of encouraging them. The friends of the Royal Family profited by this false position to insinuate that the grand national movement was a failure. At the same time any allusion in the French press to the possibility of a change of reign was suppressed by the censor. French publicists were forbidden to advocate the formation of a Greek government bent on breaking down the resistance of Constantine I.

Mr. Calogeropoulos decided that the proper time had come for him to withdraw, and on the 4th of October he made known his resignation in the following remarkable communication: "The government having been unable up to the present moment to get in touch with the representatives of the Entente Powers here in Athens, and considering its existence an obstacle to the progress of national affairs, has asked the king to accept the resignation of the Cabinet." The king accepted this resignation all the more readily because he thought that by sacrificing his minister he could renew official relations with the Entente. On the 10th of October, then, Mr. Spiridon Lambros, professor and archaeologist, who had been made Prime Minister with Mr. Zolcostas as Minister of Foreign Affairs, succeeded in re-establishing normal relations between the government and the Entente. This success was all the more inexplicable since the majority of the Calogeropoulos Cabinet had been pro-Entente in spite of their being anti-Venizelist, while the Lambros Cabinet was composed entirely of court favorites. It was just at this time that Mr. Venizelos and Admiral Coundouriotis, after a triumphal tour in the islands, landed at Saloniki. They at once formed there, with General Danglis who had joined them, a

provisional government in the form of a triumvirate, assisted by a ministry of which Mr. Politis was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was on the 10th of October, also, that Admiral Dartige du Fournet sent Mr. Lambros a note demanding, as a sequel to his note of September 2, certain concessions, including disarmament, sequestration or surrender of vessels of the Greek fleet, disarmament of certain land-batteries and also the control of the police and of the railroads. On the 11th the Lambros Cabinet yielded, and on the following day the transfer of the Greek light cruisers to Keratsini was effected and their disembarked crews were quartered in different public buildings in Athens. But the pro-German intrigues were at that time so far developed, so many armed men thronged the streets, and Mr. Lambros seemed so prone to evasions, that on the 13th the admiral was forced to emphasize and make more definite his note of the 10th. He demanded in particular that all citizens should be forbidden to carry arms of any sort whatsoever and that the embargo on the exportation of wheat from Thessaly should be raised.

Anxious weeks followed. Encouraged by the success of the Germano-Bulgarians in Rumania, the royalists became more and more insolent. The director of the newspaper *Patris* was prosecuted for having published in his paper official documents relative to the surrender of the Rupel forts. The fulfillment of the conditions prescribed in the notes of the 10th and 13th was avoided by subterfuges. The king surreptitiously concentrated troops and war material in Epirus and Thessaly; at one time he was even credited with the intention of taking refuge there. On the 18th he reviewed on the parade ground the sailors who had been disembarked from the vessels sequestered by Admiral Dartige and addressed them in a passionate speech that was full of threatening allusions. During this period the triumvirate was being organized at Saloniki, intent above all on gathering

together the contingents that were not only to battle against the Bulgarians at the side of the troops of the expeditionary force but also to forward the liberating movement in Greece. As to the question of the form of government, Mr. Venizelos refused to commit himself. In a speech delivered at a great banquet given in honor of the provisional government, he only foreshadowed the convocation of a national assembly charged with the duty "of erecting an insurmountable rampart against the assault of the king on the sovereignty of the people." On the 20th of October, in a conference held at Boulogne, the leaders of the French and English governments decided not to recognize officially the provisional government, though lending to it their material aid. France and England guaranteed to share equally the expenses of the Venizelist army and consented to an advance of ten million francs in addition.

At this moment negotiations in Athens took a new turn in consequence of the arrival of M. Bénazet, deputy of the French Chamber, charged by the French staff with a mission in the Orient. Through an Italian friend, a Signor Serpieri, a director of the French Mining Company in Laurium and on intimate terms with the court, M. Bénazet obtained an audience with the king. There followed a sudden change in policy, the details of which still elude the historical critic. The only thing that we can make out with certainty is that the king was clever enough to persuade his interlocutor of the sincerity of his friendly intentions toward the Allies and of his readiness to favor an arrangement calculated to reassure them completely. He suggested the idea of a surrender of batteries and munitions to Admiral Dartige and a transfer of troops. M. Bénazet left the palace with the idea that an amicable arrangement could easily be made and that it would be the height of cleverness to reconcile Mr. Venizelos and the king. He was confirmed in this idea by the friendliness shown him by the queen. Some

days later, Admiral Dartige was himself presented to the king, and seemed to carry away from this interview a similar impression. The king and his brothers went to dine with Prince Démidof, Minister of Russia. Then Admiral Dartige ordered one of the two landing companies which had been installed at the Zappeion since the incident at the French Legation to return to its vessel again. In an account of the Bénazet mission that appeared in the *Petit Parisien* of January 10, 1917, the result of this mission is thus set forth: "The king hoped to reconcile the desire which he felt to remain neutral with his desire to restore peace and harmony to his country. He did not demand any compensation (?) but only requested that consideration for his feelings be shown by the avoidance of any exultation—*especially in the press*—over his concessions to the Entente. Our diplomatic and military representatives were charged with the execution of this agreement, as approved by the government." On the part of the Entente it was carried out to the letter. The press was rigorously censored and could not communicate its apprehensions to the public. In the House of Commons on the 31st of October, Lord Robert Cecil declared that whatever tended to unite all the Greeks would be desirable indeed.

A further diplomatic arrangement was made a little later. In consequence of a slight collision at Ecaterini between the troops of the king and those of the triumvirate (November 4-5) the protecting powers consented to establish a neutral zone between the territories of the provisional government and those of Old Greece, in such a way that the extension of the Venizelist movement was blocked. Thessaly and Epirus, which were devoted to Venizelos and were only awaiting the appearance of Saloniki contingents in order to drive out the royalist authorities, were thus prevented from rising. The creation of this neutral zone coincided with a visit of General

Roques, Minister of War of France, first to Macedonia and then to Athens. The establishment of this neutral zone was hailed as a fine solution. With negotiations at the point where they then stood, the Cabinets of the Entente believed that an acceptable arrangement was about to be consummated with the government in Athens. They permitted, without any protest, the convoking and assembling on the 18th of November of that Rump Parliament on the dissolution of which they had insisted on June 21. The Cabinet in Athens pretended that by virtue of the Constitution the Chamber ought to resume its duties on that day. The reply might have been made that the sole Chamber that legally existed and was qualified to meet was that elected June 13, 1915. To raise no objection seemed preferable, and, besides, the Chamber was dismissed almost immediately without having transacted any business. It had, however, served to break the injunction in force against it. Did Admiral Dartige think that he could then and there demand the reward for our complaisance? On the 17th of November he sent Mr. Lambros a new note demanding the surrender of eighteen field batteries, sixteen mountain batteries with a thousand rounds of projectiles per battery, as well as of 4,000 Mannlicher rifles with 200 cartridges per rifle, of 140 machine-guns and of fifty automobile trucks. On the 20th, without awaiting a reply, he notified the embassies of the hostile states in Athens of the decision of the Entente to expel their personnel from Greek territory within forty-eight hours. On the 22d he proceeded to enforce this expulsion, and this was effected without any notable incident. On the 22d Mr. Lambros replied to the note of the 17th, offering to hand over a larger number of cannon than the Germano-Bulgarians had seized in Macedonia, 191 as against 124. He refused to meet the rest of the Entente's demands. On the 24th the admiral ordered the government in Athens to give over to the Allies ten mountain batteries

on or before the 1st of December and the rest on or before the 15th. He justified this demand by the remark: "The place of the material that I demand is not in your magazines, but on the Macedonian front at Monastir, where the destinies of the Balkan States are to be decided." It was on the 24th, too, that the government at Saloniki declared war on Bulgaria and Germany. Not being able to send a direct notification to these powers, it begged the Allied governments to be so good as to take this duty upon themselves. It is as yet uncertain whether they did this.

During the last days of the month there was extreme confusion. The Military League was reconstituted. The officers stirred up the soldiers in their barracks, the reservists were armed, the disorderly elements were enrolled by the agents of General Dousmanis. Fights broke out in the streets; many Venizelists were roughly handled. On the 26th a detachment of 200 French marines came to reinforce the little contingent encamped at the Zappeion. In the capital an artificial excitement increased hour by hour. In the provinces, where none existed, the government counterfeited it. It pictured an uprising of the peasants in Thessaly, a massacre of the soldiers at Ecaterini. Now, nowhere had the Thessalian peasants stirred, and the very prefect of Larissa himself acknowledged that not a word had been heard about rebellion in his province. As for the evzones (light-armed troops in native costume), not one had been harmed. That did not, however, hinder the Gounarists from ordering a solemn requiem—forbidden at the last minute—to "celebrate the entrance into immortality of the heroes who had fallen gloriously in a battle against the traitors." By dint of these tragi-comedies an agitation was produced which threatened at any instant to be transformed into riots and massacres. During the night of the 27th very many houses in which Venizelists lived were marked with red circles. The leaders of the

reservists proclaimed that they would hinder by force the surrender of weapons even if the government permitted it. Trenches were dug in the immediate neighborhood of Athens, and emplacements for machine-guns and artillery were prepared.

On the 27th Mr. Zalocostas addressed a protest to the representatives of the neutral powers at Athens against the blockade of the straits of Salamis by the Allies, against the control exerted by them over public utilities, against the expulsion of the personnel of the legations of the Quadruple Alliance, and, finally, against the demand for the surrender of war material. He closed his note of protest with this phrase: "I have no doubt, Mr. Minister, that you will offer me, in these painful circumstances the support that I request." On the 28th a Crown Council was held, the conclusions of which were not published; but the correspondents of news agencies and of foreign newspapers telegraphed that the government persisted in its refusal.

In spite of all these unfavorable signs, the confidence of Admiral Dartige and of General Bousquier, the French military attaché, in an amicable solution appeared unshaken. On the 29th the admiral had a somewhat long interview with the king. On the 30th the general too was given an audience by Constantine I. In the course of these conversations both were convinced that the king desired only that they should force his hand and that a simple outward manifestation of force would make it possible to gain all that they had demanded. The king, it was said, had formally declared that the Greek troops would offer no resistance; he had even had this assurance given in writing by the marshal of the court. During the 30th vessels carrying French troops cast anchor in the harbor of Pireus. They had orders to disembark the next morning and, without cannon or convoy of munitions and supplies, to go and occupy certain positions and take charge of a prescribed amount of war material that

was to be handed over to them. The expedition was organized like an ordinary field manœuvre in time of peace, with the conviction that it would encounter no resistance. Admiral Dartige, in fact, expressed to some newspaper correspondents "his full conviction" that the cannons would be delivered without any disturbance of the peace. He added that he "had not the slightest intention of resorting to force."

This optimism was not shared by the Athenians. Since the night of the 29th the troops of the garrison of Athens had left their barracks to take up positions in the environs of the city, especially at Goudi and Chalandri. By authority of a decree published on the 29th, authorizing voluntary engagements, an indirect mobilization was effected. More than 10,000 men "volunteered" the first day and were at once incorporated in the force. The instructions given to the military authorities prescribed that they should not hinder the disembarking of the Allied troops, but should follow them in equal numbers and oppose the execution of the orders of Admiral Dartige. The principal buildings of Athens were occupied by Greek marines. The inhabitants of the city who were witnesses of these preparations and of a multitude of little characteristic incidents, got the impression that a conflict was inevitable. The newspapers informed their readers to this effect. The *Messenger d'Athènes* bearing the date of the 1st of December, but printed on the 30th of November, wrote:

Not to mince matters, the government of Athens proceeded yesterday to the first act of hostility against the Entente. It began its mobilization by the system of voluntary engagements, just as Germany had put her army on a war footing at the end of July, 1914, by the system of individual orders. A particularly well informed man in Entente circles said very truly: "We have driven out the ministers of the Central Alliance, we have driven out the Germans, but we are treating with respect the German organization in Greece."



And Athens is not calling the reserves alone to the colors. It is clothing with the regulars' uniform the raw recruits, that is to say, those factors of disorder by which it has terrorized the people, that "people" in whose name the German oligarchy has committed all its crimes against Greece. It seasons with "Attic salt" its declaration of war against the protecting powers.

The idea dominant in most Athenian circles, the idea proclaimed by the pretorian guard of the kingdom of Athens, which has lately been christened "the national army," is that the Entente will not wish to aggravate the difficult situation in which she finds herself here in the Orient in consequence of the defeat of Rumania, by creating a new front on Greek territory. It is an idea which has been kept alive by the policy which the Entente has followed in Greece and which has become deeply rooted through newspaper campaigns in which men came to forget, as Clémenceau did, that party quarrels in time of war reverberate far beyond the frontiers of a country.

If the Entente, by some appropriate act, had taught the heroic camarilla that its anger was as much to be feared as Germany's, Greece would not to-day be hurried at full speed toward the abyss. She would find herself to-day in her place near her protectors, and thousands of human lives would have been spared, thousands of lives whose loss is due solely to the regard of the Entente powers for the sacred persons of their worst enemies in Greece.

For two years they have been shrieking their hostility in the very faces of the Entente. But in spite of this, the commander-in-chief of the Allied naval force continues to talk to us of good intentions and of faithful promises.

On Thursday, the 30th of November, at half-past six in the afternoon, Admiral Dartige received the official reply of the Greek government, elaborated in several successive meetings of the Cabinet. It was a refusal. The admiral was not surprised, for he believed that Constantine I wanted to have his hand forced by a demonstration of military force. Consequently, on the morning of Friday, December 1st, several French detachments, equipped as though for a dress parade, disembarked and advanced in different directions. They soon clashed with troops entrenched along the two prin-

cial roads that lead from the sea to Athens. The Greek soldiers blocked their way and opened fire. Immediately the royalists posted on the emplacements began to fire volleys with their machine-guns not only upon the Allied detachments but also on the French quartered at the Zappeion and on the annex of the English Legation, which served as the headquarters of the Anglo-French police. The Anglo-French defended themselves valiantly. But, caught by treachery, they endured cruel losses, for which, however, they made the enemy pay dearly. I shall not go into numbers here, nor shall I describe the vicissitudes of this deplorable day.\* I shall limit myself to a few statements of fact. The Greeks, whether reservists or soldiers of the standing army took the initiative in firing without the slightest provocation, and even before the Allies had tried to take away a single cannon. They fired on troops quartered in a public building and engaged in peaceful occupations. They fired through the windows at those of the Allies who had taken refuge in buildings where, on the word of Greek officers, they had believed themselves safe, they acted exactly as though they had received definite orders. They were posted in such positions that it was almost impossible to reply to their fire without hitting some of the most celebrated monuments of Athens. They had taken the ground immediately surrounding the Acropolis as their base of operations. If the fleet, moored before Salamis with its vessels broadside toward the Acropolis, had wished to destroy with its shells the batteries or the massed troops, it would have run great risk of blowing up a part of the celebrated temple. Even if the sacred marbles had received only some slight scratches from shrapnel, the Allies would none the less have been denounced to the whole world, especially to hesitating

\* See a conscientious and circumstantial account of the events of the 1st and 2nd of December in a letter written from Athens by M. Charles Frégier and published in the *Journal des Débats*, January 8, 1917.

neutrals, as barbarians that had fallen lower than Vandals or Huns.

In lack of preliminary arrangements or of orders issued in the course of the drama, the grand Allied fleet remained almost inert. Only a few shells were fired on the garden of the Royal Palace. Blockaded in the Zappeion, to which he had gone at the beginning of the day, Admiral Dartige was neither able to go out from the Zappeion so as to go directly to the palace, which was near at hand, nor to have orders sent down to the fleet. The ministers of the Entente were no whit wiser or bolder than he. We should like to be able to blot out this page of our history. While our soldiers were falling under the blows of assassins, negotiations began once more. The king proposed to hand over six batteries. From eleven o'clock in the morning until two at night there was an exchange of proposals between the king, Mr. Lambros and the ministers of the Entente. Finally, on December 2d, at two in the morning, the following agreement was signed:

The ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, having declared in the name of the admiral, commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, that they have accepted the delivery of six batteries instead of the ten that had been demanded on or before the 1st of December, and having furthermore recommended to their governments not to insist on the other demands as to cession of war material, the Greek government declares on its part that it will consent to put the six batteries at the disposal of the Allies.

This was a surrender. Count Bosdari, Minister of Italy, agreed to it only upon the insistence of his colleagues. "It made me blush for France," he said a few hours later to one of our countrymen. Not only were our decimated detachments forced to beat a sad retreat, leaving to others the duty of burying their dead and of caring for their wounded, but our companies, encamped

at the Zappeion, and all our other posts were re-embarked. Admiral Dartige left the Zappeion about seven o'clock in the morning to return on board his vessel. The survivors of the companies who had stayed with him the entire day (December 1) endured the depth of humiliation. As they possessed no means of transport for their material, military trucks were furnished them by the Minister of War of Constantine I on the request of the admiral and the French minister. Along with the soldiers of the different branches of the Allied control, these brave men, among whom were to be seen many who had fought at Verdun or at Dixmude, regained the quay of embarkation under the escort of Greek soldiers.

The 2d of December beheld even worse horrors. According to the testimony of a witness, "the hunting out of the Venizelists was a truly horrible business to which nothing can be compared unless it be the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Eve." The prominent Venizelists of Athens and Pireus were massacred, tortured and imprisoned. Their houses were pillaged from garret to cellar. The offices and presses of the liberal newspapers were destroyed. No help was given to the pursued. They were forced to endure outrages and sufferings of all kinds without having the consolation of hearing or seeing any help coming from the powers who ought to have protected their country. The mayor of Pireus, escaping from torture, said to a Frenchman: "In the whole history of France there is not a single example of a similar abandonment."

It was true. There certainly is not in the history of France an example of a like humiliation accepted so resignedly. After the retreat of all our contingents, the evacuation of all our posts and the abandonment of the control of all public utilities, there was an exodus of our nationals. The French of Attica, the personnel of the French School of Archaeology, our merchants and our journalists fled, with the surviving Venizelists, from

that land where Constantine I ruled in blood. On the 4th of December a cortège of Venizelists in chains marched past the French School. French citizenship, which had been respected for a hundred years in all Greek lands, had become an object of derision.

The negotiations of the 1st and 2d of December had their origin in a mental blindness that was quite unpardonable. They had neither been approved nor ratified by the French government, which at once perceived the seriousness of the affront and the necessity of avenging it. It informed Admiral Dartige that it was inadmissible to settle the aggression of December 1 by the cession of a few cannon, and that any discussion as to the amount of material to be surrendered would be neither more nor less than disgraceful barter. At the same time it took measures imposing an embargo on Greek shipping and a provisional blockade of the Greek coasts until it should come to an agreement as to details with the other Allied powers. Then, on December 3, it submitted proposals to the Cabinets of London, Petrograd and Rome. These proposals have never been divulged. It is possible that some of them were just as radical as those of the preceding months were harmless. When one has been cruelly misunderstood there is a temptation to pass suddenly from one extreme to another. However this may be, for the sake of appearances or for lack of proper means of execution, the four Allied powers contented themselves with announcing a blockade of the coasts and islands of Greece "which were subject to or occupied by the royal Greek authorities" (December 7) and with presenting a series of demands to the Cabinet in Athens.

While these new negotiations were hanging fire, Constantine I and his accomplices gloried loudly in their triumph. The pursuit of the Venizelists, though less savage, continued and the pillage of their houses went

on. Taking the diplomatic offensive, the Lambros Cabinet sent to its representatives abroad a dispatch in which it claimed that it had been compelled to repress an insurrection. "The investigation which is being actively pushed," said this communication, "will show the existence of an antidynastic plot, fomented by the Venizelist party, which took advantage of the riots resulting from the skirmishes in the streets. It was only owing to the measures taken by the government that the conspirators could be arrested and the perfect order that now reigns could be restored." A repression so moderate of a rebellion so criminal certainly deserved congratulation, and the Minister of War actually did congratulate the troops of the Athens garrison and "the other combatants" in an order of the day, of which these passages are worth remembering: "It is with a heart overflowing with gratitude that, by order of his majesty the king, your commander-in-chief, I address to you my felicitations and congratulations on your exemplary conduct during those never-to-be-forgotten days, the 1st and 2d of December. Your loyalty, your spirit of self-sacrifice and your courage have saved our fatherland jeopardized by enemies who hoped to disturb public order and overthrow the dynasty. Our enemies must now realize that such valiant troops are invincible, and I can from now on view the future with confidence."

On their part the royalist newspapers celebrated in big headlines, "the retreat of the Allied forces before the irresistible attack of the Greek troops," and enumerated the prisoners taken on the 1st of December. Others were glad "that the heroes of Kilkish had had the honor of fighting the heroes of the Somme and Verdun." The newspaper *Nea Hemera* wrote: "The 1st and 2d of December have been, we are proud to say, two of the greatest, the holiest, the most splendidly glorious days in all Greek history. They may be regarded as the dawn of the real independence of Greece, delivering her

from the most hateful yoke which has ever menaced the existence of our race." The association of "radical reservists" addressed to all its members the following telegram: "Receive the kiss due to heroes. The rocks of the Acropolis have, thanks to you, regained their old-time prestige. The Greeks of to-day have won laurels worthy of the past. And now, keep watchful guard around the throne of our great king." Another royalist association sent out from the "Central Bureau of the Reservists" the following circular to all its adherents: "On the occasion of the discharge for a time of the members of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Reservists, accept the fraternal kiss of the Central Bureau for the glorious events that have occurred; announce to all our friends to whom you communicate these presents that we shall remain here obedient to the word of command and that as for them, they have now only to return to their families, full of pride in the great work accomplished. Let them wait, though, with bayonets fixed, ready to return, when the exigency arises, and place themselves under the colors in order to fulfill their supreme and sacred duty toward king and country."

The Allies, who had been represented to the Greek people as having confiscated the instruments of national defense,—in particular, the French and English allies (for care was taken not to raise disturbances in the neighborhood of the Italian and Russian embassies),—were denounced, through the machinations of the king, as enemies of the Greek people. Constantine I had cunningly persuaded us to formulate claims that were sure to wound Greek national pride and had urged us to proceed to the execution of our demands by force. He had then thrown against our unsuspecting soldiers bands of highly excited Greeks, and in short, thus killing two birds with one stone, he had suppressed those Venizelists whom he had resolved to hinder, even by fire and sword, from regaining power by legal means.

He was on the point of succeeding. For a while he had fooled the Allies by granting them in an official way concessions which he afterward abrogated in fact by the issuance of secret orders. Then he had arrayed against them the Germano-Bulgarians by opening up to these hereditary enemies of Greece territories which had been won by conquest in 1912-13. Disappointed in not seeing that formidable German offensive which was to pulverize the contemptible Anglo-French expeditionary force, he found himself forced to try to gain time. He made use of the Allies to neutralize the activity of the Venizelists. He had discredited the former by getting them to enter into agreements with him, and had held the latter in check by having their best weapons wrenched out of their hands by the protecting powers themselves. When finally driven to the wall he had broken away over the corpses of the Allied soldiers. He believed himself saved. But the armies of William II still failed to appear before Saloniki. Constantine I had to try once more to gain time. He found the governments whom he had smitten on the one cheek perfectly ready to turn to him the other.

On the 14th of December the ministers of the Quadruple Entente delivered a new note to the government in Athens. They demanded reparation and the immediate transfer to the Peloponnesus, under the effective control of officers belonging to the Allied armies, of the Greek troops stationed on the mainland of Greece. Mr. Zolcostas, interspersing a few pleasantries in his reply, promised to execute the removal of the troops in question. He begged the four powers to "reconsider" their decision to continue the blockade and offered as "the best guarantee that all misunderstandings would be avoided, the firm and most sincere desire of the royal government and of the Greek people to see confirmed as soon as possible the traditional excellent relations with



the four powers and the renewal of a close friendship based on reciprocal confidence."

Mr. Zalocostas would hardly have dared to use irony like this if he had not felt that disagreements of one sort and another were undermining the action of the Allies. He knew, far better than the public, which was systematically kept in ignorance of the negotiations between the chancelleries of the Entente, that the identity of views among them was by no means perfect. But one factor in the case was self-evident: the Italian press of all parties inveighed bitterly against Mr. Venizelos, while on the other hand it extolled Constantine I. The *Tribuna* wrote:

The disorders in Athens prove that Constantine and his country are in perfect agreement, that no dynasty was ever a more faithful interpreter of the spirit and will of a nation than his. Hence the dangerous absurdity of those sentimental and magnanimous attempts on the part of the Allies to revivify, or, worse yet, to recognize, as though again existent, another Greece, purely fantastic and imaginary, a direct heir of ancient Greece. Let us leave this "Hellas" out of account and realize that we have only Greece with which we must deal. It is greatly to be deplored, and the events of to-day are the sad results of this error, that in newspapers of a certain tendency, and even in the parliaments of the Entente, this truth has not yet come to be courageously recognized, and that they continue to speak of a Hellas that exists wholly in the person of Venizelos.

On the 22d of December the same journal wrote:

There were only two straightforward ways of dealing with Greece: alliance or war; an alliance, however, with the recognized chief of the state; with the king, and not with Venizelos, who is looked upon askance by both army and people; or else war against the army, the organized force of the state. Instead of this, what has the Entente done? It has made an alliance with one individual against the king, and has declared war on the Greek people, subjecting it to humiliations and threats. The Entente has put forth all its efforts not to the end that it may

win Greece over to itself, but that it may conquer for the benefit of Venizelos.

So, according to Rastignac (Signor Vincenzo Morello), we ought to have run after an alliance with Constantine as we had solicited that of Cobourg in Sofia, and to have carried on a campaign against Venizelism similar to the pressure we had exerted on Serbia. The *Corriere della Sera*, the most important and influential newspaper in Italy, had no hesitation, in order to damn Mr. Venizelos in the opinion of the protecting powers, to denounce him as an accomplice of Constantine's. On the 5th of December this famous Milan journal said:

And there, in Saloniki, rubbing his hands with satisfaction, is Venizelos, Constantine's best subject and his most useful minister *in partibus*. If the Central Empires should win the victory, the king would make capital out of the injuries inflicted on his country by the Allies, their oppressors. If the Entente gets the upper hand, Venizelos will come knocking at the door of the peace congress and will show his declaration of war against Germany and Bulgaria. The trick is most astoundingly crude. There is no need even of imagining that the king and the rebel are in secret accord. It is enough to know that the double game exists in reality. But, within the last few days, a member of the English government, in the House of Commons, assured Venizelos of the protection of England; and the righteous indignation of the French press will perhaps not be sufficiently strong to cut short the comedy and to determine the Entente to take measures against those who are committing sabotage on her war in the east. The phil-hellenism of our allies is proof even against bullets. While Greece glories in her hostility to Italy, while she opposes to our rights in the Mediterranean a Pan-Hellenism that is alike grotesque and frenzied, the diplomacy of our allies, so it seems, proposes at all costs to avoid breaking with her, in order to be able, in the future, to count upon her friendship. Phil-hellenism seems an essential element in their program notwithstanding all that has happened in Greece during the last two years and more.

This language furnished an explanation of the fact that the Quadruple Entente persisted in not officially

recognizing the provisional government in Saloniki. It proved that if the protecting powers wished to take any serious action, they would have to resign themselves to acting alone and without the support of the Cabinet in Rome. They appear to have decided to take this step. At the end of December the Cabinet in London appointed Lord Granville, counselor of the British Embassy in Paris, to represent the government of his majesty in Mr. Venizelos' provisional government at Saloniki, with the title of "diplomatic agent." Some days later the Cabinet in Paris appointed M. de Billy, counselor of the French Embassy at the Quirinal, to a like position. On the 31st of December the ministers of France, Great Britain and Russia in Athens, declaring that they were acting as representatives of the guaranteeing powers of Greece, sent Mr. Zalocostas a note formulating a series of demands for guarantees and reparations. The guarantees consisted in the reduction of the Greek forces in continental Greece "to the number of men strictly necessary to the maintenance of order and to the policing of the country"; in the transfer to the Peloponnesus of all superfluous armament and munitions, as well as of all the machine-guns and of all the artillery of the Greek army with their ammunition; in the prohibiting of all meeting and assembling of reservists north of the Isthmus of Corinth; in forbidding every civilian to carry arms; in the re-establishment of the different controls by the Allies. As reparations the three powers exacted the immediate liberation of all persons detained because of political opinions or political offenses, and indemnities for the victims of the 1st and 2d of December (paragraph 4); the dismissal of the commander of the first corps of the army, apologies on the part of the Greek government to the ministers of the Allies, a public ceremony of salute rendered to the Allied colors, and finally, permission to use the Itea-Larissa route for the transportation of troops. No definite time-

limit was fixed, but the blockade was to be maintained "until satisfaction had been afforded on all the points above indicated."

The Allies persisted, then, in their arrangements for the handing over of supplies, the transfers of troops and the system of controls by representatives of the Allies. They even made their blunder worse by making it more precise. In this note in which they were supposed to be exacting punishment for the outrages of the 1st and 2d of December, they offset all that they gained by the following: "On their part, the guaranteeing powers give a formal engagement to the Greek government not to permit the armed forces of the government for the national defense, profiting by the withdrawal of the royal troops from Thessaly and Epirus, to pass over the neutral zone established in agreement with the Greek government." Though it seemed logical, this agreement was really monstrous. It placed in a clear light the fundamental viciousness of the whole arrangement. Under pretext of hindering the Venizelists from profiting by movements of troops made independently of them, the protecting powers sanctioned a provisional arrangement which cut Greece into two parts and protected the king against the national movement. This ought to have been enough to reassure Italy. But in spite of it, she refused to participate in the concerted measures. She instructed Count Bosdari to present a separate note to this purport:

Italy, by this present communication, affirms her joint responsibility with her allies in matters general. She shares in the demands and declarations contained in the aforementioned note, touching the military guarantees that the powers of the Entente deem necessary to exact of Greece in view of the present situation in the Balkans, as well as the reparations that these same powers believe to be due them in consequence of the events of the 1st of December.

As to what concerns the claims in paragraph 4 of the note

of the guaranteeing powers, in view of the fact that these have to do with questions of internal order, Italy believes that she has no right to intervene and declares that she takes no interest in the investigation into said claims.

The three protecting powers did not maintain this distinct attitude of theirs for any very long time. In the course of conferences held in Rome during the first days of January by the Prime Ministers of Italy, France, Great Britain and the representative of Russia, assisted by eminent civil and military personages, they were surprised by a dispatch from the Cabinet in Athens, dated January 6, raising various objections to the note of December 31. After a discussion, of which the public knew nothing, the four governments of the Entente on the 8th of January united in a common declaration. They established as a principle that they had as their end and aim the protection of the army in the east from any and every menace of a flank attack from the Greek side. Then they fixed a limit of fifteen days for the execution of the ultimatum of the 31st of December, specifying that if, after eventual acceptation, any obstacle whatever was willfully raised to the execution of this arrangement within the prescribed time, they would claim against their liberty to act in such a way as to assure the safety of their nationals by making use of their own resources on land and sea. Unfortunately, this desire to be energetic was spoiled by an agreement with Constantine I that was more far-reaching than that of the 31st of December. It was thus framed:

The Allied powers promise not to allow the partisans of the provisional government to take advantage either on land or sea of the withdrawal of Greek troops into the Peloponnesus, with the purpose of occupying any portion whatever of Greek territory that is thus deprived of all means of resistance.

The Allied powers in like manner promise not to let the authorities of the provisional government establish themselves in any territories now in the possession of the royal government

which they [the Allies] may feel themselves called on to occupy temporarily for military reasons.

When Baron Schenk was expelled from Athens with a pack of agents of the German propaganda, he replied, it is said, to an American journalist who asked him about the future: "The question as to whether my work in Greece will last depends entirely on the Allies, who up to now have been my best assistants." They continued to be his best assistants.

They became more and more involved in the tangle of negotiations. On January 10 Mr. Zalocostas replied to the ultimatum of the 8th by a note that was at once ironical and full of traps. He began by availing himself "with the liveliest satisfaction" of the "exact guarantees" that the powers had been so good as to give to Greece. Then he expressed his desire "in this case also" to do all that was in his power to avoid all misunderstanding. With this point once established, the rest of his letter simply bubbled over with sources of misunderstanding. He said that in order that the guarantees demanded by the powers might be as little annoying as possible, "they could be determined, in the accord that would come about, without permitting any infringement on the different departments of the administration or with the means of communication in the interior." Mr. Zalocostas deigned afterwards to withdraw an objection that had been raised to the liberation of the persons referred to in paragraph 4 of the note of the 31st of December, but he demanded in return the setting free "of persons imprisoned for not having acceded to the revolutionary government, or arrested on the occasion of the forced conscription carried on by the seditious committee." As to the indemnities to the victims of the 1st and 2d of December, he proposed to refer the matter to the Greek courts and proposed a mixed inquest. Having thus given "a supreme evidence of his sincere

intentions" he declared that "the conditions for the lifting of the blockade might be regarded as already fulfilled." "Finally," said the minister in closing, "while appreciating fully the guarantees of the Allied governments on the subject of the revolutionary movement, guarantees which will reassure the minds of the Greek people, the royal government expresses the hope that, in the spirit which inspired the promise which the Allied governments had been good enough to make in the next to the last paragraph of their note of January 8, 1917, they may be willing to apply analogous measures to the territories at present occupied by Allied troops and notably to the islands which they had occupied after the 1st of December.

Evidently, Mr. Zalocostas must have felt encouraged in his policy of subterfuge. The *Idea Nazionale*, a newspaper very much in favor at the Italian Embassy, wrote: "The Greeks now regard Italy with friendly feelings, one may almost say, with gratitude. The government of Athens seems to put all its confidence in the Italian Minister." This journal considered all appeal to the special rights of the guaranteeing powers as absurd formalism and as outworn partisanship. It characterized as a serious and unjustifiable mistake the attempt to base political action in Greece's case "on treaties of protection that were antiquated and utterly out of date." After the conference at Rome on January 10, it commented thus on the decisions reached: "This conference was convened here in order to show a respect to Italy commensurate with the increasing importance of her rôle as well as in order to recognize her special interests in the Orient." The journal *La Stampa*, Signor Giolitti's organ, said squarely: "Italy is at present the real 'protecting power' of Greece."

In spite of this protection, the three guaranteeing powers could not let the impertinence of Mr. Zalocostas

pass. On the 13th of January their representatives, with the Italian Minister acting in concert with them, addressed a new note to the government of Athens, rejecting all the suggestions of Mr. Zalocostas and insisting on the immediate and unconditional carrying out of the guarantees and reparations that had been demanded. On the 16th of January, after a Crown Council, which had been specially called, the government of Athens decided to yield. It declared "that it had no idea of procuring any limitations to the acceptance of the demands formulated by the powers and that it gave its adherence to the precise terms as announced." On the 24th of January the *Official Journal* of Athens published a decree deposing from office General Callaris, commanding the 1st corps of the army. On the 25th Mr. Zalocostas addressed the following letter to the representatives of the Quadruple Entente: "Conformably to the promise given in its reply to the ultimatum of the Allied governments dated January 8, the royal government presents formal apologies to their excellencies, the Ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia because of the regrettable incidents of the 1st of December, 1916." On the 29th, in the presence of the ministers and before detachments of the land and sea forces of the four powers, in Zappeion Square, the Greek troops commanded by a Greek general and Prince Andrew, the king's brother, marched solemnly by and saluted the Allied colors. On the same day, Mr. Zalocostas informed M. Guillemin that the dissolution of the societies of reservists had been declared and that the judiciary had been charged with the extension of this measure.

Such was the outcome of this long diplomatic duel. We obtained a nominal satisfaction, but in reality Constantine I came out of the conflict not only exonerated but with reputation enhanced. Under the inspiration of his hidden councilors who were always with him, he



continued to elude the effective execution of the guarantees accepted by his government.

This diplomatic bickering was succeeded by skirmishing between the Allies and the administration. The time-limit of fifteen days, set by the declaration of the 8th of January, elapsed, but the prescribed transfers of troops and war material had not been effected, the controls which had been provided for had not been established, and the reparation to the victims of the 1st and 2d of December had not been made. Mr. Lambros and his civil and military coadjutors employed every artifice to avoid the execution of the conditions laid down by the Entente. The soldiers transported to the Peloponnesus made their way back again in citizen's dress or on military leave of absence; or better yet, such men as were needed north of the Isthmus of Corinth were dressed up as police, if indeed they were not turned into comitadjis outright. Lies were told about the contents of cases of weapons, and arms were cached in the earth. Informed of this by the Allied controllers, General Caubone, the new military attaché of France, presented claim on claim. Messrs. Lambros and Zolostas dissimulated, denied, protested their good-will, evaded the issue and were profuse in promises. Meanwhile, the royalist newspapers invented calumny on calumny against the Allies. Their principal argument was furnished them in the continuation of the blockade; they proclaimed that the Entente was starving the people; they organized indignation meetings, and saw that repeated entreaties and petitions were sent to the king. In order not to permit public opinion to be led astray, the ministers of the Entente, on the 19th of February, caused to be published in the newspapers a declaration to the Greek people summing up the situation as follows:

The representatives of the Allies have already called the attention of the royal government to the hostile attitude of the Greek

press and to the danger that Greece will incur if she persists in fostering public excitement and in making attacks that are as often as not founded on calumny and lies. For example, in the matter of the blockade, certain newspapers are trying to spread the impression that this is unjustly maintained since Greece has, as they say, fulfilled all her engagements. This is manifestly inexact. The military control of the Allies cannot take the responsibility of declaring that the promised guarantees have been given, while there remains in continental Greece a great quantity of arms, the existence of which is recognized by the Greek government itself since it has prescribed to the authorities the date on which they must be surrendered. The Allied control is all the less justified in consenting to leave these arms on this side of the Peloponnesus, since they might be employed by the hostile organizations which continue to exist in all parts of Greece and especially in Thessaly, where they constitute a perpetual menace to the oriental army. Other important facts have been brought directly to the knowledge of the Greek government by the chief of the Allied control,—for example, the laying of mines on the banks of the Corinth canal. In these circumstances the Greek people ought not to be surprised that the Allies in default of that correct attitude which they have a right to expect on the part of Greece, cannot regard the guarantees stipulated in the note of January 8 as having yet been yielded. Nevertheless, far from being indifferent to the sufferings of an innocent people, the Allied powers have already looked into the question of what measures they will take to furnish Greece with food supplies just as soon as circumstances will permit. In consequence, the Allied ministers call the attention of the Greek government once more to the grave responsibility that it would incur if it tolerated any longer the excesses of the anti-Venizelist press, which seems to have no other design than to delude public opinion and thus hinder the re-establishment of friendly relations between Greece and the Allied powers.

This appeal to common sense provoked in Greece a redoubling of recriminations and calumnies. New journals were even created specially charged with vilifying the Allies. Ever since the 2d of December the Venizelist newspapers had ceased to appear. The public could only look for information to the organs of King Constantine. It was thus kept in an utterly abnormal

state of ferment. The Lambros Cabinet took advantage of this to oppose to the demands of the Allies exceptions or contestations that were increasingly irritating. Time went by without the threatening clause of the declaration of the 8th of January being put into effect. In the second fortnight of March, Sir Francis Elliot, the English minister, and M. Guillemin, the French minister, left the warships in which they had lived since the events of December in order to reopen their embassies. Emboldened by impunity, Greeks, disguised as comitadjis, gave themselves up to insulting provocations and even to crimes. A band of these irregulars massacred a patrol of Senegalese in the vicinity of Serbia. By way of reprisal General Sarrail gave the order to shoot all armed individuals belonging to the irregular bands. The order was executed. A troop of cavalry of the Saloniki army, sent into the valley of Vistritsa, discovered in the monastery of Zidani (Zidavrión) concealed weapons and armed comitadjis; he confiscated the arms and shot the comitadjis, among whom was a Greek officer. There arose at once a chorus of maledictions in the royalist press. This extract from *Scrip* of the 5th of April gives an idea of what these were like:

Ajax in his madness butchered sheep, thinking that he was butchering his enemies. General Sarrail butchers abbots, notaries and police, thinking that he is butchering comitadjis. And for fear that this massacre may give rise to the idea that there are no longer any comitadjis and that he, Sarrail, is from now on useless, he announces that his orders will continue to be executed and that the irregulars will be shot. Is every peasant who does not abandon his wife and his daughter to the "needs of the army," or who manifests fidelity to his country and devotion to his king, regarded as an irregular? . . . The Greek government would commit the worst of errors in making any reply to the general's communication. There is only one reply to make: "The general lied!"

The question of indemnities to the Venizelists who had been injured or had been subjected to damages raised

interminable controversies. After the arrival of the two French and English representatives in the commission instituted for this purpose, Mr. Lambros put forth various unacceptable claims. The pretense was made that they could find no appropriate place for the sessions of the commission. Then they proceeded to stumble around in the tangles of procedure. Finally, the ministerial journals suggested the idea of reconventional counter-claims against the Entente; so, for instance, the *Neon Asty* proposed to demand a sum of six million francs to defray the cost of the transport of troops and war material into the Peloponnesus. Passing frankly to the offensive, the royalists called upon Mr. Lambros to purify the personnel of the university which had been contaminated by Venizelism. They expressed the regret that the cleaning up had not been more complete on the 2d of December. Openly banishing from now on the idea which, with the object of misleading the Entente, had been for a long time lauded, that idea, namely, of a possible reconciliation between the king and Mr. Venizelos, they rejected with horror the possibility of such a rapprochement: "Constantine," cried the *Acropolis*, "has the innocence of a sacrificial lamb."

These actions did not, at the end of the winter of 1917, meet in France and England with the same indulgence as previously. In spite of the tender regard for the susceptibilities of Constantine I which was felt by the Cabinets of Paris and London, public opinion in the two countries expressed itself more and more strongly against the policy of inactivity in Greece. It found a powerful echo in the two parliaments. At the Palais Bourbon the Greek situation was the subject of very lively discussion in secret committee. In the meanwhile, in the second fortnight of March, the Briand Cabinet resigned. Although it had not lost its majority, and the immediate cause of its withdrawal was the difficulty of replacing the Minister of War, who had been forced out,

it is certain that its authority had been weakened by its way of handling the Greek question. The Ribot Cabinet which succeeded it felt that it ought, in this connection, to defer to public opinion. It showed very soon that it intended to settle the question for once and all. At that very time revolution broke out in Russia. After a week or two of uncertainty, it became clear that the forced abdication of Nicolas II was in reality a deposition and that Czarism itself had been overthrown. Constantine I lost in the Petrograd court a valuable support. Some days later, at the beginning of April, the United States intervened in the European conflagration. President Wilson declared war on Germany and proclaimed the right of peoples to dispose of themselves freely. He thundered against absolutism and autocracy. This anathema re-echoed widely throughout all Hellas. The ground began to fail beneath the feet of the "slayer of Venizelists," the constitutional king who had been transformed by the grace of William II into the Lord's Anointed, accountable to God alone.

On the 28th of March two Venizelist newspapers, the *Hestia* and the *Ethnos*, appeared again in Athens. On the 13th of April came the turn of the *Kairi* and on the 22d that of the *Patris*. The others followed after an interval of a few days. At about the same time those of the Ionian Islands in which the Allies were not established gave adherence one after another to the provisional government in Saloniki. On the 7th of April, the anniversary of Greek independence, the ministers of the Entente did not appear at the celebration of the national holiday and the Allied vessels, warships as well as the vessels of the merchant marine, were not decorated with flags in honor of the day. To stimulate the enthusiasm of the crowd, the royalists had spread the rumor that the Venizelists would seize the opportunity of the national holiday to make an attempt on the life of the king and to stir up riots. But all passed off very

calmly. This did not hinder the organs of Constantine on the next day from assuring the "idol adored of the people" that he would be defended against all attempts. The journal *Scrip* in a lyrical outburst put in the mouth of the people this hymn "to the martyr king":

I am there, Sire, at thy side! Guard in thy powerful hands the strength of the state and the honor of the fatherland. I, yes I, will support thy glorious throne. No power in the world shall tear me away from thy feet. Even in chains, with hands in irons, and feet in fetters, even under the tyranny of starvation and the threat of death, I will continue to shout "Long live the king!"

This exaltation of spirit, generously rewarded by the treasury of the German propaganda, succeeded in deluding the neutrals and even some of those on the side of the Entente. It did not deceive observers that were well advised. One of them, M. Charles Frégier, on the 15th of April (*Journal des Débats*, April 28) wrote from Athens:

In the course of the difficult negotiations of these latter times the Entente has surrounded the throne of Constantine with guarantees, destined to uphold it even against the will of his subjects; these guarantees are perhaps, at this moment, his surest support. On the day when the logical course of events shall for once and all abolish them, when the Entente shall decide to support its friends, wherever they may be, in old Greece as well as in the new, we shall perhaps be amazed to see this much vaunted prestige of Constantine sink out of sight in an instant, crushed under the too heavy burden imposed on it.

At the Quai d'Orsay in Paris and at the Foreign Office in London the same opinion began to prevail. The realization dawned on them that, instead of administering in small doses, drop by drop, as it were, their moral and material support to the provisional government, heavily burdened with anxiety, it would have been more profit-

able as well as more clever freely and frankly to facilitate its task. What results might the Allied powers not have obtained, as M. Frégier said in the letter cited above, "if they had devoted as earnest efforts to strengthening New Greece, considered as the eleventh of the Allied states, as they had spent in order to keep the crown on Constantine's head?"

Considerations of this nature found more and more acceptance among serious thinkers. On the 19th of April, in a meeting at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, Messrs. Ribot, Lloyd George, Boselli and Sonnino discussed, among other subjects, the Greek question. Their decision was not divulged, but a few days later the court at Athens showed symptoms of uneasiness. The rumor of Mr. Lambros' resignation was current. Mr. Lambros, a mere tool of the king, had no special reason for withdrawing nor even any desire to do so. If the power left his hands, it was because the monarch judged it advantageous to sacrifice this minister to the supposed rancor of the Entente. There was some talk of Mr. Zaimis, who had become once more the governor of the National Bank, as future Prime Minister. These tentative moves had a somewhat cool reception in the French press. The change of person, as proposed, would have brought us no satisfaction. For some time, there was no further mention of it. But another rumor spread. An intention to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince was attributed to Constantine I. The French press observed that neither Greece nor the Entente would gain anything by the change. Since, after the appointment of the Ribot ministry, the censor had allowed greater freedom to the press, it demanded the definitive and radical settlement of the Greek question. It demanded of the powers that had signed the declaration of the 8th of January to reclaim their liberty of action in accordance with the formal clause that had provided for this even-

tuality, and to act vigorously in Attica, or at least to permit the provisional government to act by its own agencies in Thessaly and the rest of the kingdom. These articles in the French journals were much commented on in Athens. People believed that they saw in them signs that were the precursors of grave measures. On the 1st of May the Congress of Hellenic Colonies, assembled at Paris, declared Constantine I and all his dynasty deposed from the throne and from all royal prerogatives. At the same time it "appealed to the benevolence of the Allied powers no longer to hinder any province from giving its adherence freely to the national government at Saloniki" and begged them "to recognize the Greek Republic just as soon as the assembly called to constitute it should have proclaimed it." Then the Zaïmis clique appeared once more, and was accepted on the 3d of May. After long parleys Mr. Zaïmis consented to leave his position at the National Bank to take upon himself once more the prime ministry with the portfolio of foreign affairs. Almost all his colleagues were professed anti-Venizelists.

Mr. Zaïmis had very little support in the press. Treated as a suspect by the royalist editors who had been besought to conceal their sentiments so as not to bring discredit on the new royal cabinet, he was described by most of the Venizelists as a man of straw. The *Makedonia* characterized him as "the Pilate of crucified Greece." In France a marked distrust of him was evinced. Although he declared that his entire program consisted in the re-establishment of friendly relations with the Entente, he was suspected of holding to these friendly relations only in order to permit the king to gain more time and to corner the grain-harvest of Thessaly for the exclusive advantage of the royalists. Besides, General Dousmanis, Colonel Metaxas, Messrs. Streit, Mercouris and Co. kept hold of the power both public and secret, and with it remained in the confidence



of Constantine I. Mr. Zaïmis did, to be sure, immediately put at the disposal of the commission on indemnities a meeting place for which they had up to that time looked in vain. He did, to be sure, announce that measures had been taken against the armed bands that were overrunning Thessaly, and he also let it be known that he was going to send away from Athens seven colonels who were known to be hostile to the Entente. Very small guarantees these to the Entente!

As a matter of fact, during the entire month of May, the agents of control under General Cauboue kept discovering arms and ammunition concealed in the capital itself, or in the suburbs or the provinces. The police continued to dress themselves up as comitadjis, and the comitadjis to disguise themselves as police. The officers of Constantine's staff elaborated as assiduously as ever the plans for co-operating with the Germano-Bulgarians against the day so eagerly longed for, the day when the soldiers of William II would descend on Saloniki. Though to all appearance dissolved, the League of Reservists was reconstituted under the direction of a nephew of Mr. Gounaris by the name of Sayas. In reply to objections on the part of the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Sayas threatened the government "with an explosion of popular anger." As a substitute for the League of Reservists or as a superstructure on it, there was formed, under the auspices of Mr. Livieratos, a retired magistrate, a so-called "Federation" of the syndicates of the different trades and professions and of popular societies. The royalists gave out that this was a union of labor organizations, but the real labor organizations entered a protest. Messrs. Sayas and Livieratos, however, negotiated with Mr. Zaïmis none the less freely, because of this fact, on an absolutely equal footing. They issued a manifesto against the dismissal of the seven colonels.

These were not the only indications of a dangerous

situation. The authorities themselves assumed a provocative attitude. On the 21st of May a decree of arrest issued by the grand jury brought before the assizes the director and manager of the newspaper *Patriis* on the score of having published in 1916 some letters that established the part taken by Deputy Callimassiotis, a friend of Mr. Gounaris, in supplying the German submarines. On the 29th of May the navy war-council sent forth an order for the arrest of Admiral Coundouriotis for the crime of high treason. At the end of the same month some Venizelists were beaten and imprisoned on the island of Aegina by the police. During the night of the 30th-31st an attempt was made to assassinate two English officers. A few days later some French officers of the military control, on a tour of search, were obliged to turn back before a party of reservists. The newspaper *Scrip* accused the Senegalese of the expeditionary force of kidnapping little children, killing and eating them.

At the same time the Constantine cult became a sort of idolatry. On the 27th of May the second anniversary of the miraculous cure of the king by the wonder-working picture of the Panagia of Tenos, a thanksgiving service was held at the Metropolitan Church, which the *Embros* reported in the following words: "When the reverend orator, incomparable in the force of his logic and the brilliance of his rhetoric, had affirmed in thundering words that King Constantine was not destined to be dethroned but to be crowned with the imperial diadem in Constantinople, when he had finished chanting the hymn: 'Be victor, thou emperor and king,' the throng rushed forward to kiss the hands of the prelate, while on all sides re-echoed these cries: 'Down with the tyrants! Long live our adored king!'" On the 3d of June, the king's fête, the followers of Constantine were carried away by another ourburst of devotion to their sovereign. The Federation of Workingmen presented

the monarch with an iron cross, begging him to wear it whenever he appeared before the troops with the bâton of a German field-marshal in his hand. After the *Te Deum* at the cathedral Constantine I betook himself to the University to take part in the dedication of his own bust. Two other busts of him were to be dedicated in the course of the month, one at the barracks of the 7th regiment of infantry and the other at the Chamber of Deputies. Fate, however, was reserving for Constantine a ceremony of quite a different nature.

During the month of May the Cabinets of Paris and London had come to an agreement. Their chiefs had held additional conferences in Paris and in London. Assured of the agreement of Russia and the consent of Italy, they had resolved on radical measures. Their decisions, the outcome of secret deliberations, became known only after they had been put in execution, and even then not fully. We may quite certainly say that they had a double object: the sequestration of the harvests in Thessaly so that they would profit all Greece, and the re-establishment of the constitutional régime. Suspecting what was to happen as to the first part of the program, Mr. Zaïmis proposed to yield to the Allies a portion of the Thessalian harvest. As to the second part, the government in Athens did not know exactly in what this re-establishment of the constitutional régime consisted. But it flattered itself that it could bring it to naught. The time has not come to tell what supreme efforts were put forth in order to make the Allies' enterprise miscarry as it had done in the month of June, 1916. This time these efforts failed.

On Wednesday, June 6, the Athenians suddenly learned of the arrival in Greek waters of M. Jonnart, a French senator, invested with the rank of High Commissioner of the protecting powers. Then they noticed a great movement of warships in the bay of Salamis, the Saronic Gulf and the Gulf of Corinth.

The royalists insinuated that it was going to be just the same with the Jonnart mission as with the earlier demonstrations of the Allies. Then they saw the vessel that carried the High Commissioner, after a short stop at Salamis, sail off to Saloniki. What passed between M. Jonnart, Mr. Venizelos and General Sarrail is not known. On the 10th M. Jonnart returned to Salamis. On the 11th, in the morning, the lightning struck. In an interview with Mr. Zaïmis, the High Commissioner of the three protecting powers demanded in their name the abdication of King Constantine and the designation of his successor, to the exclusion of the Crown Prince. What then became of the tens of thousands of heroes who had sworn to defend the king, their idol, to the very last drop of their blood. They raised a hue and cry, turbulent throngs filled the streets, but there was no breach of the peace. What were the thoughts that passed through the mind of Constantine I? After bitter reflections on the vicissitudes of mundane affairs, he decided to submit. On Tuesday between 9 and 10 in the morning Mr. Zaïmis informed M. Jonnart that "His Majesty the King, solicitous as ever of the interests of Greece alone, has decided to leave the country along with the Crown Prince and has designated as his successor Prince Alexander," his second son.

Constantine I did not officially abdicate nor did his eldest son resign his claim to the throne. They hoped without doubt to be restored to Greece by William II, the Conqueror. They left the throne in the meantime to a complacent prince who would keep the crown for them, and they left the political power to a minister who would care for their interests. But they went away without daring to defend themselves or to have any defense made for them. They fled before the storm, carrying with them the curse of Hellas. Embarked for Italy, they had not yet reached the residence of their choice when their hopes were dashed. While they

slipped out of Lugano amid manifestations of public scorn, Mr. Venizelos was starting for Athens. After a brief consultation, the High Commissioner decided, with Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Zaïmis agreeing, that half-way measures would do no good and that the best thing was to restore the power to Mr. Venizelos, who would reassemble the Chamber elected June 13, 1915. No sooner said than done. In consequence of the publication of a proclamation in which he boasted of his desire to follow in the footsteps of his illustrious father, Alexander I was required to apologize and to declare his willingness to respect the Constitution. He is now only the shadow of a king, obliged to content himself with signing the papers that his Prime Minister puts before him. The latter, acclaimed by the crowd, which, according to the statement of the paid agents of the German propaganda, hated him and was sure to tear him in pieces, has taken up with a firmer hand than ever, and with an increased prestige, the direction of national affairs. The people of Thessaly are saluting the soldiers of Sarraïl's army as their liberators. The Morea is yielding submission. The army in its entirety is rallying in support of the new régime. General Dousmanis, Colonel Metaxas, the two Mercouris and their acolytes meekly embarked for Corsica. All the thunders of war which for two years had intimidated the Entente with their rumbling died away entirely.

A few days had sufficed to bring about this great change. The decision of two governments, the energy and ability of one man, the mere presence of an armed force capable of breaking down all resistance got the better at once of the extravagant showy boasting of a clique of fanatics. The errors of 1915 and 1916 have not been repaired, for political mistakes always leave behind them something irreparable. But the humiliation of the 1st of December has been avenged and the prestige of the Entente re-established. Greece has been restored

to her natural destiny and respect for treaties has been confirmed. It has been proved to the world that the protecting powers, when they co-operated with the chief of the liberal party in restoring the constitutional régime did not, as the Germans and some neutrals claimed, commit a violation of international law comparable to the invasion of Belgium in August, 1914, but that they acted as guardians of the liberties of a people bound to them by solemn treaties. What could be done in Greece in the spring of 1917 was done, but there is still much to do in the East.

**THE END**



## THE AMERICAN-HELLENIC SOCIETY

The American-Hellenic Society was founded in November, 1917, with the following objects:

*Purpose:* To defend the just claims of Greece in particular and those of Hellenism in general.

*Secondary:* To further the educational and political relations of the United States of America and Greece.

*Means:* To promote the establishment of exchange professorships in the Universities of Greece and America; the objects being the diffusion of a knowledge of the literature and political institutions of this country throughout Hellas, and the encouragement of the study of the ancient and modern Hellenic language and literature in America.











